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"CAUSE IN FACT" IN TORT LAW-
A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL EXAMINATION
Paul J. Zwier*
Under traditional tort analysis, "cause in fact" has long been an essential
element in finding a defendant liable for a plaintiff's injury.' The cause in
fact requirement has been essential not only to negligence theory,' but also
to the growth of strict liability theory in products liability law.3 Tort theory
* Assistant Professor, University of Richmond, The T.C. Williams School of Law. B.A.,
Calvin College; J.D., Pepperdine University School of Law; LL.M., Temple University School
of Law.
1. See J.L. AUSTIN, A PLEA FOR EXCUSES, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 123-34 (1961); 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 470 (2d ed. 1898); Bohlen, Con-
tributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 223, 235 (1908). For a discussion of causation in tort
law, see generally A. BECHT & F. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE
AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES (1961) [hereinafter cited as BECHT & MILLER); 2 S. GREENLEAF,
EVIDENCE § 268 (4th ed. 1852); H.L.A. HART & A. HONOR8, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959)
[hereinafter cited as HART & HONORS]; Pound, Causation, 67 YALE L.J. 1, 8-11 (1957); Smith,
Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (pts. 1 & 3), 25 HARv. L. REV. 103, 303 (1911-1912) [hereinafter
cited as Smith].
2. Cause in fact can be analyzed using the "Green analysis." Professor Leon Green uses
a "duty-risk" analysis of tort law to determine issues of liability rather than a proximate cause
analysis. See Green, The Casual Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543,
536 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Green]; Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX.
L. REV. 42, 42-74 (1962). According to Green, the beginning point of all tort liability is affirm-
ative conduct. Under the "Green analysis," the first step in establishing a defendant's liability
requires identification of the defendant and a connection between his conduct and the victim's
injury. Green, Identification of Issues in Negligence Cases, 26 Sw. L.J. 811, 813 (1972). See
also Cole, Windfall and Probability: A Study of "Cause" in Negligence Law-Part I, Uses
of Causal Language, 52 CAIFs. L. REv. 459, 464 (1964) (setting forth a methodology for analyzing
the meaning of "cause" in varying legal contexts) [hereinafter cited as Cole].
Cause in fact also has been analyzed in terms of Prosser's more traditional approach. See
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TH-E LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
"An essential element," Prosser states, "of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, or
for that matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection between the
act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." Id. § 41,
at 236. Prosser further concludes that the burden of proof of cause in fact is on the plaintiff:
On the issue of the fact of causation, as on other issues essential to his cause of
action for negligence, the plaintiff, in general, has the burden of proof. He must
introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is
more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor
in bringing about the result. A mere possibility of such causation is not enough;
and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the prob-
abilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct
a verdict for the defendant. Where the conclusion is not one within the common
knowledge of laymen, expert testimony may provide a sufficient basis for it, but
in the absence of such testimony it may not be drawn.
Id. § 41, at 241. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 (1934) (cause in fact is not listed as a
separate element but can be found codified in § 281).
3. See 2 J. DooLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.35 (1977 & Supp. 1982); 1 R. HURSH &
H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2D § 1.41 (2d ed. 1974).
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generally has required that a plaintiff identify that the defendant's act, omis-
sion, product, or dangerous animal was sufficiently connected to the plain-
tiff's injury." By requiring that the plaintiff prove identification and causa-
tion before a defendant is required to pay for a plaintiff's injuries, tort law
satisfies society's notion of justice.
Since the 1940's, however, a series of California cases has both directly
and indirectly challenged this cause in fact requirement. This line of cases
includes Ybarra v. Spangard,5 Summers v. Tice,6 Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel,7
and most recently, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories., In Sindell, the defen-
dant drug manufacturers sold diethylstilbestrol (DES), a substance which
allegedly causes cancer in the daughters of some women who took the drug.
The Sindell court held that plaintiffs need not carry the burden of proving
which of the defendants manufactured the product ultimately causing the
plaintiffs' injuries." Instead, the court required only that the plaintiffs show
that each defendant enjoyed a substantial share of the DES market and that
the plaintiffs' injuries were in fact caused by the drug.' In so holding, the
California Supreme Court required that all the defendants answer for plain-
tiffs' injuries regardless of whether the plaintiffs could identify the specific
manufacturer causally connected to each particular injury." A defendant
could escape market share liability'2 only if that defendant proved that it
4. See P. KEATON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 20-21 (1963); Cole, supra note
2, at 498.
5. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
6. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2dl1 (1948).
7. 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
8. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
9. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
10. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
11. Id.
12. Under the theory of market share liability, each defendant will be found liable for a
proportion of the judgment that is equivalent to its share of the market unless the defendant
can prove that its product could not have caused the alleged injury. See id. at 611-12, 607
P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Although the extent to which this theory may be employed
is yet to be determined, market share liability is properly applied where a product manufactured
by the defendants is produced from the same or similar formula and the plaintiff, through
no fault of his own, cannot identify which defendant was responsible for his injury. Market
share liability was justified by the Sindell court as follows:
Under this approach, each manufacturer's liability would approximate its responsi-
bility for the injuries caused by its own products. Some minor discrepancy in the
correlation between market share and liability is inevitable; therefore, a defendant
may be held liable for a somewhat different percentage of the damage than its
share of the appropriate market would justify. It is probably impossible, with the
passage of time, to determine market share with mathematical exactitude. But just
as a jury cannot be expected to determine the precise relationship between fault
and liability in applying the doctrine of comparative fault, . . . the difficulty of
apportioning damages among the defendant producers in exact relation to their market
share does not seriously militate against the rule we adopt. As we said in Summers
with regard to the liability of independent tortfeasors, where a correct division of
liability cannot be made "the trier of fact may make it the best it can."
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was not the cause of the plaintiffs' injury."
Although the Sindell decision drew a sharp dissent,'" it does not appear
Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (citations omitted). The Sindell court's
rationale arose from a formula set forth in a law review article which made a correlation be-
tween percentage of market share and liability:
[Ilf X manufacturer sold one-fifth of all the DES prescribed for pregnancy and
identification could be made in all cases, X would be the sole defendant in approx-
imately one-fifth of all cases and liable for all the damages in those cases. Under
alternative liability, X would be joined in all cases in which identification could
not be made, but liable for only one-fifth of the total damages in these cases. X
would pay the same amount either way. Although the correlation is not, in prac-
tice, perfect [footnote omitted], it is close enough so that defendants' objections
on the ground of fairness lose their value.
Id. at 612 n.28, 607 P.2d at 937 n.28, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 n.28 (quoting Comment, DES
and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FoRDrLw L. REv. 963, 944 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
13. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
14. The dissent in Sindell declared that the majority had gone "too far." It recognized
that an essential element in an action for negligence required some reasonable connection be-
tween the defendant's act or omission and the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 614, 607 P.2d at 938,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent argued that precedent
would not allow liability to attach until one of the defendants was proven to have caused
plaintiffs' injury. The Sindell dissent found it wholly speculative and conjectural whether any
of the five named defendants in the instant case actually had caused plaintiffs' injury, id. at
615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147, and labelled the majority opinion as "complete
unfairness" and "unwise." Id. at 614, 618, 607 P.2d at 938, 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146, 148.
Furthermore, the dissent viewed the ramifications of the majority's rejection of well-established
principles of causation as being limitless, imposing liabilities which might exceed even absolute
liability. Id. at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146. See Note, Industry Wide Liability,
13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 980, 998 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Industry Wide Liability].
The dissent based its criticism on precedent but articulated little of the philosophical or historical
rationale which caused the majority's decision to be morally offensive. Perhaps the dissent's
inability to clearly articulate its rationale was because, for many, causation has seemed in-
herently elementary and essential to past ideas of responsibility. Prosser writes:
It is never enough for the plaintiff to prove merely that he has been injured by
the negligence of someone unidentified. Even though there is beyond all possible
doubt negligence in the air, it is still necessary to bring it home to the defendant.
On this too the plaintiff has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence;
and in any case where it is clear that it is at least equally probable that the negligence
was that of another, the court must direct the jury that the plaintiff has not proved
his case. The injury must either be traced to a specific instrumentality or cause
for which the defendant was responsible, or it must be shown that he was responsi-
ble for all reasonably probable causes to which the accident could be attributed.
PROSSER, supra note 2 § 39, at 218. See generally HART & HONOR9, supra note 1, at 24-57.
A position contrary to Prosser's is taken by Calabresi. According to Calabresi, a causal require-
ment may not always be essential:
Causal requirements, like all other legal requirements, must ultimately justify
themselves in functional terms. Law is a human construct designed to accomplish
certain goals. Often-perhaps most of the time-the goals are terribly complex and
hard to analyze clearly, and one is properly suspicious of analysis and prescription
that would discard time-honored legal terms because one cannot find immediate,
clear policy justifications for them. Still, the object of law is to serve human needs,
and thus legal terms (which in other contexts may have other, deeper meanings)
1982]
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that the decision offended societal notions of justice as there has been little
negative reaction from commentators. 5 It is curious that the notion of cause
in fact, which for the last few centuries has been so essential in assessing
responsibility, and which has been viewed as expressing society's "bare
minimum requirement for imposing liability,"'" can be so easily and effort-
lessly disregarded." This disregard may stem from a failure to fully analyze
or understand the historical goals for which the cause in fact requirement
was intended to serve.
The philosophical and historical underpinnings of the cause in fact re-
quirement seem to support present day notions of justice which, in turn,
provide the legal bases of tort law. The question arising from Sindell and
similar cases is whether those historical and philosophical forces which
undergird cause in fact have continuing vitality. Clear identification of the
original underpinnings are necessary to determine if these same forces exist
today. Without the continued existence of these forces, the rule to which
they gave birth should cease to exist.
Some may argue that because fault is no longer necessary to establish
liability in many tort actions,' 8 the cause in fact requirement should also
must sooner or later be linked to the service of human needs.
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 69, 105 (1975).
15. See generally Comment, Products Liability: Drug Manufacturers' Liability for Latent
Defects in Drugs, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 468 (1981) (market share liability is appropriate because
it is an objective means to apportion responsibility among manufacturers who profited from
the sale of the drug); Note, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories: A Market Share Approach to
DES Causation, 69 CAur. L. REv. 1179 (1981) (market share liability which results in manufac-
turers bearing cost of negligent conduct should be applauded); Note, Market Share Liability:
An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HAgv. L. REv. 668 (1981) (market share ap-
proach not only compensates victims but also may promote deterrence in the future). But see
Note, Industry Wide Liability and Market Share Allocation of Damages, 15 GA. L. REv. 423
(1981) (market share liability often unfair and is better in theory than in practice).
16. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 66 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as Malone].
17. Sindell raises the question of whether cause in fact is a necessary element for placing
responsibility for an injury on a defendant. This case challenges the long accepted requirement
that the plaintiff bear the burden of identifying the cause of plaintiff's harm. The result is
an abondonment of the connection or relationship necessary for traditional defendant liability.
See Novel Tort Theory Upheld, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 7, 1980, at 3, col. 1; Allocating Blame, Pro-
ducts Liability Law Is In Flux As Attorney Tests A Radical Doctrine, Wall St. J., Dec. 30,
1980, at 1, col. 6. One pre-Sindell commentary pointed out that:
At least it is true that the plain man's causal notions function as a species of basic
model in the light of which the courts see the issues before them, and to which
they seek analogies, although the issues are often very different in kind and com-
plexity from those that confront the plain man. These notions have very deep roots
in all our thinking and in common ideas of when it is just or fair to punish or
exact compensation. Hence even lawyers who most wish the law to cut loose from
traditional ways of talking about causation concede that at certain points popular
conceptions of justice demand attention to them.
HART & HONORs, supra note 1, at 1.
18. See generally PROSSER, supra note 2, §§ 75-78, at 492-516 (persons will be held liable,
[Vol. 31:769
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be eliminated. There is, however, a fundamental difference between cause
in fact and fault. Traditionally, analysis of fault connotes blameworthiness, 9
while analysis of causation focuses on the identification of the actual forces
that produced the injury. 0 Furthermore, the requirement of cause in fact
becomes more important as fault principles are deemphasized. Because the
cause in fact requirement may be the only major hurdle facing plaintiff's
attempt to secure recovery, its strategical importance as a defense to the
defendant has increased dramatically.
An historical review of the cause in fact requirement gives perspective to
the forces which produced the recent abandonment of the cause in fact
requirement in Sindell.' Many historical and social reasons for adopting the
regardless of fault, for harm caused by animals, fire, or abnormally dangerous things and
activities).
19. In the nineteenth century, it was commonly felt that liability should not be imposed
without the defendant being at fault, and fault was deemed to coincide with moral blame.
Id. § 4, at 17-18. See Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes in Classfication,
30 HARV. L. REv. 241, 255 (1917) (liability founded on fault or blameworthiness). Today,
tort liability may not necessarily be founded on moral blameworthiness, but rather on a form
of "social fault" which may be defined as a failure to conform to a level of conduct prescribed
by society. See PROSSER, supra note 2, §§ 4, 75, at 18, 493.
20. One commentator described the functional differences between fault and causation:
[Tihe term "proximate cause" is defined as requiring "foreseeability or anticipa-
tion of some harm" as the result of defendant's conduct. This gives a context of
fault or some other form of wrongdoing, and destroys or at least overshadows
the simple idea of cause and effect. There is frequently causal relation between
a defendant's conduct and a plaintiff's hurt without any negligence or other wrong
on the defendant's part, and hence no liability. Causal relation never of itself deter-
mines or imposes liability. The elements of wrongdoing and damages must also
be present. The term "cause" is frequently used in the sense of "fault" but that
usage is not involved in causal relation. The dual meaning of "cause" (fault plus
causal relation) however is the source of much of the trouble in separating causal
relations from negligence.
Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEx. L. Rv. 471, 475 (1950) [hereinafter
cited as Texas Law].
21. Pound articulated the need for historical review when he wrote:
Legal history, then, may be made to show us the analogies, the legal premises,
which have developed as the potential bases of legal growth. It may be made to
show us the ideals which have developed, to which jurists and judges have sought
to make law conform by logical use of these analogies and logical drawing out
of these premises. It may be made to show the way in which the working out
of these analogies and the logical development of these premises have determined
both the content and the spirit of the transition which is the most important part
of our law both in bulk and in intrinsic significance. . . . [Iln the long run, the
condition of law depends upon the condition of the traditional element in the legal
system, by which legislative rules are interpreted and developed and into which,
if they succeed in establishing themselves as law, enacted rules are absorbed and
incorporated.
R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 12-13 (1921) [hereinafter cited as POUND]. Oliver
Wendell Holmes believed that historical inquiry was a means to derive the reasons behind a
given rule or law. See O.W. HOLMS, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881) [hereinafter cited as HoLMEs].
According to Holmes, customs and beliefs at a certain time in history provide the impetus
and reason for the development of a rule. Over time, the rule becomes ingrained in society,
1982]
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cause in fact requirement no longer exist and other forces have precipitated
changes in the tort law. There are historical forces working against the cause
in fact requirement and these forces are as ingrained in tort law as those
supporting the cause in fact requirement. For organizational purposes, an
appropriate place to begin an analysis of the recent disregard of cause in
fact is at the source of the common law notions of justice which originally
fostered the cause in fact requirement. Second, this paper will discuss those
historical forces mitigating against a cause in fact requirement. Finally, a
new force of corporate accountability will be shown to exist, which when
combined with the historical mitigating forces have brought about the demise
of the cause in fact requirement in Sindell. To fully understand this historical
discussion, however, another issue must first be addressed: How did the
definition of cause in fact evolve?
DEFINITION OF CAUSE IN FACT
Although the analytical element of cause in fact has not always been
specifically identified in common law torts,2" courts continually insisted on
some measure of causation.23 To satisfy the concept of causation at early
common law, one was required to make only a general determination of
what had occurred and which person or object was to blame." Around the
turn of the twentieth century, however, courts divided the causation issue
into two distinct inquiries: a determination of proximate or legal cause, and
cause in fact.25 This dual analysis was viewed as demonstrating the courts'
and the original customs and beliefs fall into disuse but the rule remains intact. Jurists then
attempt to explain the rule's existence by reference to modern-day policies, and the "reasons"
behind the rule take on new form. Id. One great contribution made by Holmes was his relentless
inquiry into the reasons behind the original customs and beliefs. It was Holmes' belief that
only by determining the actual reasons for a given rule could progress be made in predicting
the development of the common law. Id. at 1.
22. See Malone, supra note 16, at 60. Malone notes that it was not until this century that
courts treated the inquiry into the cause in fact of an injury as being distinct from the inquiry
into the proximate cause of an injury.
23. In the words of Professor Leon Green: "Causal relation is the universal factor com-
mon to all legal liability." L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXMATE CAUSE 132 (1927) [hereinafter
cited as RATIONALE]. Professor Green describes the inquiry into the cause of an injury as one
governed by matters of degree. According to Green, there is "no such thing as sole cause,"
rather, courts are to determine whether the defendant's conduct sufficiently contributed to the
injury in such a way as to make him responsible. Id. at 134. Ultimately, the question was
whether the conduct involved was of the type for which society should make the defendant
responsible. Id. Thus, the inquiry into "cause," according to Green, was an inquiry into the
legal or proximate cause of the injury.
24. The use of the word "cause" at this time had no precise meaning since cause in fact
was not yet analytically separate from proximate cause. "Cause," then, was used as a shorthand
form of stating a conclusion as to what occurred. Malone, supra note 16, at 60.
25. The idea of identifying a cause of an injury often is confused with the identification
of the legal or proximate cause of an injury. While identification of cause is limited to what
force actually caused the injury, legal or proximate cause is a separate determination that the
defendant's conduct is such that the law will impose liability. These two concepts are distinct
[Vol. 31:769
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increased proficiency in analyzing the separate causes that produced injuries
to the plaintiff.2" The cause in fact analysis focused on possible causes of
the injury before an inquiry into legal or proximate cause proceeded.27 This
analytical separation did little, however, to clearly define the distinctive
characteristics of the cause in fact element.2" Although a number of causes
for an injury could exist, the courts reserved inquiry into these causes until
after a determination of whether a defendant was sufficiently connected to
the injury.2"
Unfortunately, the two causation inquiries often commingled,30 and failure
to clearly define proximate cause yielded further confusion.3 The most
because a given defendant may be the sole cause of an injury, however, a court may not chose
to hold the defendant liable. Sindell, however, posed the opposite problem. There, the defen-
dants were never proven to be the actual cause of the plaintiffs' injury, but the court was
willing to impose liability.
26. For a discussion of turn-of-the-century decisions which grappled with the cause in fact/
proxjmate cause distinction and the tests set forth to solve the problem, see RATiONALE, supra
note 23, at 144-70. For a full discussion of this division of inquiry, see HART & HONORt,
supra note 1, at 79-102.
27. The cause in fact inquiry, according to Professor Green, focuses on the contribution
of the defendant's conduct to the injury, and then a separate determination of liability is made:
The causal relation issue . . . does not initiate an exploratory search for all the
causes that contributed to the victim's injury, or a search for the cause, or the
proximate or the legal cause.... A philosophic or scientific exploration of defend-
ant's conduct may be relevant to other issues but not to the causal relation issue.
The inquiry is limited to the fact of defendant's contribution to the injury. The
search for proximate, legal or other causes is designed to determine whether the
defendant's conduct should be condemned and he be made to compensate for his
victim's injury. . . . The only relevance the consideration of other cause factors
may have in the determination of the causal relation issue is the light they may
shed on whether defendant's conduct contributed to the injury.
Green, supra note 2, at 548-49 (emphasis in original).
28. The problem of separating the inquiries of proximate cause and cause in fact stems
in part, from the inability of the layperson to distinguish the two concepts. "For the layman,"
Malone noted, "cause and purpose are a single blend." Malone, supra note 16, at 67. Separa-
tion of the concepts, according to Malone, is an attempt to further define causation issues,
but in doing so, "we lose much of the meaning of the very phenomenon we are investigating." Id.
29. See supra note 27.
30. Although the judiciary attempted to distinguish the two concepts, the problem of con-
fusion arose because the language used to explain the differences was similar. See Malone,
supra note 16, at 60. Malone stated, however, that the two inquiries take on different mean-
ings, but his analysis is primarily ex post facto:
When policy can be recognized openly as the dominating factor, so that it can
be dealt with directly, the problem can be meaningfully labeled as one of prox-
imate cause, duty, risk, negligence, etc. On the other hand, when the attention
of the trier is focused primarily on what happened and the usual techniques of
factual inquiry can be effectively used, the issue is properly termed one of simple
cause although policy impulses may assist materially in giving the proper turn to
the judgment. Language has not yet furnished us with sharper tools than these.
Id. at 97.
For an in depth discussion of the problems the Texas courts encountered in reconciling the
two theories, see Texas Law, supra note 20, at 474-90.
31. For a discussion of various formulations of proximate cause, see generally Beale, The
1982]
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common method for distinguishing the two inquiries treated cause in fact
as a question for the trier of fact,32 and proximate cause as a question of
law." The determination of each causal element was divided to keep the
two inquiries separate. Initially, it is the judge's duty to determine whether
the defendant's act can, as a matter of law, be the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury. 4 Thereafter, the jury, as the trier of fact, makes the final
determination of whether the defendant can sufficiently be identified as the
cause of the injury."
Cause in fact analysis, however, necessitated more than a simple factual
inquiry established through production of testimony."' From his under-
standing of, and experience with, the world, the trier of fact was required
to make a judgment that certain effects follow certain antecedents. 7 To
ascertain whether a cause in fact existed, the trier of fact's "judging
capacity" needed to be furnished with enough evidentiary facts to enable
him, based on his experience, to rationally connect the defendant's act with
the plaintiff's injury, in order that the trier of fact could label the defen-
dant's act as the cause.3"
The definitional problems of cause in fact become apparent upon close
examination of this process. Each trier of fact must deduce a cause from
evidentiary facts, and this deduction is dependent upon the trier's past ex-
perience. Because each trier of fact's deductions are dependent upon vary-
ing past experiences, inconsistent conclusions regarding similar fact patterns
can result. This incongruity results because evidence that may be viewed as
causation to one trier of fact may be too tenuous to support such a finding
to another. 9
Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REV. 633 (1920) (finding of proximate cause
requires that defendant act or fail to act in violation of a duty, and such act or omission
caused or created a force which caused the result) [hereinafter cited as Beale]; Edgerton, Legal
Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211 (1924) (determination of proximate cause should include a con-
sideration of whether it is reasonable and just to treat the defendant's act as the cause of
the harm); McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1925) (an act which pro-
duces an intended result is the proximate cause of the harm); Smith, supra note 1, at 107-08
(proximate cause is either the act which directly causes the harm, or the act which sets other
things in motion to cause the harm); Texas Law, supra note 20, at 475-76 (finding of prox-
imate cause requires that defendant could foresee his act resulting in harm).
32. See RATIONALE, supra note 23, at 135.
33. See id. at 136-41. See also. PRossER, supra note 2, § 42, at 244 (proximate cause is
a question of law which decides whether the defendant should be legally responsible).
34. By virtue of his or her control over the proceeding and the jury instructions, a judge
has great latitude in directing the outcome of the proceeding based upon the linguistical confu-
sion inherent in the definition of proximate cause.
35. See Malone, supra note 16, at 61.
36. Evidentiary data alone is insufficient to make a finding of cause in fact. Meaning at-
taches to the data only after it is assimilated through the mental process of deduction. Id. at 61.
37. Id. at 61-62.
38. Id. at 61.
39. Malone argues that because determining cause in fact necessarily involves a deductive
process based on our experiences, we move further away from an inquiry into the actual cause:
[Vol. 31:769
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The problem with cause in fact is related intimately to the philosophical
search for ultimate cause. One philosopher, David Hume, concluded that
cause and effect could never be proved."' He argued that causation was depen-
dent upon deductions from past experience and concluded that it was not
possible to project whether a past experience would be consistent with a
future event." This interrelationship between philosophical speculations and
legal realities was commented on by Malone who stated that "proof of what
we call the relation of cause and effect . ..can be nothing more than 'the
projection of our habit of expecting certain consequents to follow certain
antecedents merely because we had observed these sequences on previous
occasions.' "42 Using Hume's analysis, Malone further observed that the
determination of cause in fact was, in reality, a promulgation of legal policy
because judgment was involved in every causal determination."3
The search for the distinctive qualities of the cause in fact inquiry led
to confusion as to whether causation was related, in any way, to the cause
in fact element. If, under Hume's analysis, cause in fact cannot be proved,
and if a cause in fact determination requires proof that a minimum con-
nection or relationship between plaintiff and defendant exists before liability
is imposed, then the question of whether the cause in fact element is essen-
tial would appear to beg itself. Despite the Humean problem of causation,
the courts have acted as if causation can be proven. Experience confirms
that the law will act as if causation and effect can be discovered and proved."
In response to the difficulties surrounding the illusive definitions of prox7
imate cause and cause in fact, courts dealt with the problem by developing
the "but for" or "sine qua non" test to describe cause in fact.'" According
to this test, liability may attach if it can be said that but for the occurrence
of the defendant's act, omission, or product, the plaintiff would not have
been injured."' The identification of both a specific defendant and that defen-
dant's act, omission, or product was said to be indispensable to the existence
of the plaintiff's injury.' 7
"[I]t is noteworthy that in passing from one of these determinations to another we have moved
almost imperceptibly from matters of 'fact' to matters of 'judgment' or 'evaluation.' " Id.
at 62. One commentator recognizes that "judgments of causation are essentially relative and
purposive," but then argues that the next question to ask is how do these judgments change?
Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 255, 257 (1950).
40. See D. Hu~m, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING § V, pt. 1 (1907).
41. See id.
42. Malone, supra note 16, at 64-65 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDaOOK OF T=E LAW OF TORTS
§ 44, at 223 (2d ed. 1955)). See also supra note 39.
43. Malone, supra note 16, at 65-66.
44. Id. at 65.
45. Id. See PROSSER, supra note 2, § 41, at 238 nn.12-18.
46. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 41, at 239.
47. Liability should only be imposed, Malone wrote, when a plaintiff could demonstrate
the presence or existence of the defendant's misconduct. Malone, supra note 16, at 66. Malone
then explained the significance of using the "but for" test to establish the connection between
the defendant's act or omission and the plaintiff's injury: "[T]he but-for test seems to be the
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The "but for" test was initially the best means by which to provide the
jury with a guideline to determine whether a cause in fact existed." This
test assisted the jury in allocating responsibilities by permitting an inquiry
into the relationship between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's action
without assessing blame.49 The test also required an initial identification of
a defendant by the plaintiff. The identification requirement protected the
defendant from defending lawsuits in which the plaintiff was unable to declare
affirmatively that the defendant caused the injury. 0
In most cases, the "but for" test was easily applied. At times, however,
the jury encountered problems in applying the test and, thus, was forced
to speculate about the specific cause." If the court was not satisfied with
the jury's conclusion regarding the casual relationship between the plain-
tiff's injury and the defendant's action, a directed verdict resulted for
the defendant. 2
The courts varied in describing the necessary level of identification and
causation needed for the jury to find liability. For example, one court held
that, the connection between the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's in-
juries could "not be opposed to human experience."" Another court re-
quired that the jury be able to "reasonably infer" that the defendant's ac-
best the law can do in its effort to offer an approximate expression of an accepted popular
attitude toward responsibility." Id.
48. The "but for" test is characterized by Prosser as a rule of exclusion. Given that for
any single event there is an infinite number of antecedent events or causes, and that there
also will be an infinite number of future events or causes as a result of the single event, the
"but for" test operates to exclude those remote consequences from consideration of the cause
in fact of the injury. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 41, at 239. See also Malone, supra note 16,
at 66 (the "but for" test may be the best test developed for causation thus far, however,
"it ignores the irresistible urge of the trier to pass judgment at the same time that he observes").
But see Beale, supra note 31, at 640-41 (the rule requiring exclusion is a matter of judicial
limitation and therefore is a determination of proximate or legal cause rather than cause in fact).
49. This initial inquiry was limited solely to whether the defendant's conduct was a cause
of the injury. Motivation and intent were irrelevant to this stage of the inquiry, as legal liability
could only attach after the defendant was determined to have contributed in some way to the
injury. Green, supra note 2, at 548.
50. According to Green, tort liability required that a plaintiff identify the particular defendant
which caused the harm: "The beginning point of all tort liability is affirmative conduct, and
the first step in establishing a defendant's liability is to identify him and connect his conduct
with the victim's injury." Id. at 546 (emphasis in original).
51. This was especially true in instances where there were two or more causes which could
have brought about the injury." See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. See also PROS-
SER, supra note 2, § 41, at 239 (the "but for" test fails in a situation where two or more
causes could have caused the plaintiff's injury).
52. See PROSSER, supra note 2, § 41, at 241 (plaintiff cannot prevail unless he satisfies
the burden of proof on the issue of causation). See, e.g., Houston v. Republican Athletic Ass'n,
343 Pa. 218, 220, 22 A.2d 715, 716 (1941) (in the absence of either direct proof or strong
circumstantial evidence to support an inference of causation, a directed verdict is appropriate).
53. Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 108 Cal. App. 591, 595, 291
P. 848, 850 (1930) (normal human experience would support a finding that the failure of a
pool owner to provide adequate safety measures was the proximate cause of the decedent's death).
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tion was the cause of the plaintiff's injuries to find liability."' On the other
hand, other courts required that the jury find that the defendant's actions
were "equally consistent with,"" probably,5 6 or "the only reasonable in-
ference of"5 ' the cause of the injuries. In every case, regardless of how the
standard was described, the court required an identification by the plaintiff
of the defendant. 8
The "but for" definition was most troublesome analytically where the facts
identified more than one cause of a plaintiff's injury. 9 In these situations,
the cause in fact inquiry often resembled a determination of proximate cause
in that the trier of fact had to determine which of the number of causes
could have been feasibly responsible for the plaintiff's injury. Therefore,
the "but for" test was of little help when the trier of fact attempted to
determine the sole cause between competing causes. 61
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Minneapolis, Saint Paul
54. Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) (the jury could reasonably infer
that failure to ring a bell before starting the locomotive was the proximate cause of the decedent
switchman's death).
55. Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 24, 68 A.2d 517, 528 (1949) (propounded
theory of negligent use of product by defendant consistent with testimony of improper design
and construction).
56. See Harper v. Young, 139 Neb. 624, 627, 298 N.W. 342, 344 (1941) (evidence support-
ing an inference of negligence must exclude the probability of other causes of the injury).
57. Houston v. Republican Athletic Ass'n, 343 Pa. 218, 220, 22 A.2d 715, 716 (1941) (when
two or more equally probable causes of an injury exist, defendant cannot be held liable on
the basis of a mere guess).
58. See supra notes 53-57.
59. For example, in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430,
179 N.W. 45 (1920), a defendant's railroad engine started a fire which merged with another
fire to ultimately destroy the plaintiff's property. The "but for" test was not applied because
either fire may have caused the destruction of the property. Instead, the defendant was held
liable because the fire was a "material element" of the destruction of property. Id. at 440-41,
179 N.W. at 49.
In another case, passengers in an automobile were thrown onto the roadway after colliding
with a truck, and were then run over by three automobiles which were not able to stop. Either
the collison with the truck and the subsequent impact on the roadway, or the automobiles
colliding with the bodies could have caused the resultant death. The court did not use the
"but for" test; instead, it held that the truck driver and automobile operators could both be
fully liable even if it was "impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to
the injury." Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Mo. 1965), appeal dismissed,
385 U.S. 5 (1966).
In a final example, two defendant motorcyclists passed plaintiff's horse-drawn wagon, one
on each side, and frightened the horse due to the smoke and loud noise. The horse went out
of control and plaintiff's wagon collided with another wagon. The court held both defendants
liable because each one alone could have been the cause of the harm. Corey v. Havener, 182
Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902) (contribution to the injury was enough to make both defendants
liable). See also Daniels v. Dillinger, 445 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (joint and several
liability imposed on defendants involved in a multiple automobile collision at an intersection).
60. The "but for" test becomes wholly inadequate to determine the issue of causation when
combined causes are present because it cannot be said that either cause alone would be suffi-
cent to bring about the injury.
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& Sault Sainte Marie Railway,"1 adopted a test which was designed to better
handle the determination of cause in fact in cases involving multiple causes.
This test considers whether the defendant's action was a "material element"
or a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injury.62 Similar ta the
"but for" test, this substantial factor or material element test included the
notion that the defendant's act or object needed to be possessed by the defen-
dant and produced the plaintiff's injury. 6  According to the Minnesota
Supreme Court and a majority of courts that adopted Minnesota's approach,
the substantial factor test was the minimum requirement for assessing
liability.
6
61. 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
62. In Anderson, the defendant's railroad engine started a fire, which then merged with
another fire of unknown origin to cause damage to the plaintiff's property. The defendant
argued that it should be absolved of liability because the fire of unknown origin alone could
have been sufficient to have caused the damage. Id. at 440, 179 N.W. at 49. The Anderson
court disagreed because that would allow the railroad to escape liability without an evaluation
of whether one defendant's action was a "material factor" in causing the damage. The court
was unwilling to let the railroad escape liability without making this assessment: "[O]ne who
negligently sets a fire is not liable if another's property is damaged, unless it is made to appear
that the fire was a material element in the destruction of the property .. " Id.
63. Specifically, it was the plaintiff's burden to establish that a minimal relationship between
a defendant's action and the plaintiff's injury existed, and also that this minimal relationship
required the identification of the defendant. See PROSSER, supra note 2, § 41, at 241.
64. The substantial factor test was adopted by the American Law Institute in the first RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS, § 431 (1934), and has been retained largely unchanged in the current Restate-
ment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). The Restatement version of the test
has been applied in at least 31 states. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-434 (App.
& Cum. Supp. 1982-83); Annot., 100 A.L.R. § 984 (1965). The major reason for the wide
acceptance of the test is its flexibility. Prosser maintains that the substantial factor test is an
improvement over the "but for" test because it leads to the same results as the "but for"
test where that test is applicable, and additionally applies to situations where the "but for"
test is not useful, such as multiple cause cases. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 41, at 240. Accord
I J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 8.02 (1982).
Perhaps another reason for the cause in fact requirement stems from a linguistic confusion.
Obviously, part of our definition of liability is the concept of responsibility. Liability is imposed
because one is responsible, in some way, for the harm caused. But the term responsibility is
elusive. Historically, it comes from the latin word respondere which means "answerable or
accountable for." VIII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 542 (1933). The word responsibility,
then, suggests the burden of coming forward and answering questions about a happening. One
commentator, Professor H.L.A. Hart, suggests that the word responsibility also has been used
synonymously in many instances with the word causation. Hart, Varieties of Responsibility,
83 LAW Q. REv. 346, 362-63 (1967). Historians, for instance, will identify the death of Duke
Ferdinand as the "cause" of World War I. They also use the word responsible interchangeably
with causation. Id. at 363. Although the Duke's death may be considered the cause for World
War I, it certainly was not responsible for the war. The notion, therefore, that cause in fact
is essential to ideas of responsibility may stem from the fact that they often are used synonymous-
ly. Id. at 348. Yet, Hart notes that causation is analytically a much more neutral term than
responsibility, and that responsibility, in a legal sense, has long been a moral judgment of
blame which demands an answer from the actor. Id. at 349. The belief that injustice results
when liability is imposed without the proof of cause in fact, then, may partially stem from
the linguistic confusion of the notions of responsibility and causation.
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SOURCE OF THE CAUSAL ELEMENT: THE NEED TO IDENTIFY THE OWNER,
CONTROLLER, OR MANUFACTURER OF THE THING CAUSING THE HARM
To trace the history of the cause in fact requirement, an analysis of early
concepts of liability and their relation to causation is helpful.6" The concept
of liability in early tort law was closely related to the desire for vengeance.66
Early Greek law provided that when a slave killed a man, the slave was
turned over to the deceased's family to do with as the family wished.6
Similarly, according to early Hebrew law, when an ox killed a man the ox
was put to death and the deceased's family was deemed to have avenged
the death." Finally, Roman law embodied the notion of vengeance by re-
quiring the surrender of animals or retribution by the wrongdoer when
damage was done.69
A strong argument exists that this need for vengeance was related to the
idea of moral blame. 0 Blame was applied, however, in a broader sense than
the modern day use of the word." The ancient mind was not willing to
65. An historical inquiry into the roots of cause in fact provides insight into the evolution
of the meaning of the term. Through this analysis, patterns of change can be detected by which
we can to predict and analyze cases which fringe on the outer boundary of socially and legally
acceptable definitions of liability and cause in fact. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
66. Holmes noted that the need for vengeance generally was regarded as the driving force
behind the institution of Roman, German, and Anglo-Saxon laws which replaced blood feuds
with more civilized legal procedures. HOLMES, supra note 21, at 2-3. As stated by one commen-
tator, the need for revenge was so strong that absent proof that a certain act was caused by
the defendant, liability was imposed because of man's "primitive urge to find a wish and will
behind all causation. . . . [T]he actor was presumed guilty unless he could 'be judged utterly
without his fault .... .' " Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U.L. REV.
855, 861-62 (1953) (quoting Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (1618)) [hereinafter cited as
Ehrenzweig]. See Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Act: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315,
316 (1894) (primitive law was driven by an "instinctive impulse, guided by superstition, to
visit with vengeance the visible source, whatever it be, human or animal, witting or unwitting,
of the evil result") [hereinafter cited as Wigmore].
67. HOLMES, supra note 21, at 7. If the owner refused to surrender the slave, he was obligated
to "make good the loss." Id. at 7-8.
68. See infra note 73.
69. HOLMES, supra note 21, at 8. Holmes notes that this law was applied to slaves and
even children.
70. Primitive law, Enrenzweig argues, attached liability when moral blame could be found.
Due to man's "primitive animistic mind," however, moral blame was found even when an
act of nature, such as a lightning bolt, caused the injury. Ehrenzweig, supra note 66, at 859-60.
See HOLMES, supra note 21, at 3 ("[v]engeance imports a feeling of blame, and an opinion,
however distorted by passion, that a wrong has been done").
71. Wigmore provides the following example of how the primitive mind went to great lengths
to assess blame in an instance where someone was injured by an accident of nature:
Baldur the beautiful was beloved by all the gods, and Frigga had exacted an
oath from all things-fire, water, stones, trees, and all-not to harm Baldur; for
Baldur had dreamed of his own death. Then the gods, his safety assured, began
in fun to pelt him with stones, clubs, and battle-axes, and found him indeed in-
vulnerable. But Loki the jealous was vexed because Baldur was not hurt; and going
in disguise to Frigga, he learned that the mistletoe alone had not been sworn, for
it seemed too feeble a plant to do harm. Then Loki went to Hodur, the blind
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accept the "accident" or harmful result without assessing blame." Blame
was placed on whatever caused the harm, whether it be the person, animal,73
or the inanimate object causing the harm.74 Just as one might kick the door
in which he catches his fingers, early notions of liability required that the
object causing the injury be subject to surrender. In short, a search through
the causal chain of events for an object or an agent to blame was essential
to fulfill the desire for revenge-the driving force behind liability.
Later, compensation was introduced into the law. It not only helped pre-
vent blood feuds arising from avenging acts, but primarily was applied to
harms arising from the acts of slaves and animals." The most significant
force in promoting compensation was the owner's desire to retain control
god, who had been standing apart, for he had nothing to throw. He could not
see to aim, so Loki gave him the mistletoe twig and guided his hand, and the
twig flew, and struck Baldur lifeless. Then the other gods werefor laying strong
hands on the murderer; but they were in a sacred place. And Hodur fled. And
Odin said, 'now, who will wreak vengeance on Hodur, and send Baldur's slayer
to Hades?' The avenger was Wali, Baldur's younger brother, who washed not his
hands and combed not his hair until he had fulfilled his vengeance and smitten
to death the slayer of Baldur.
Wigmore, supra note 66, at 319-20 (uncited medieval Frisian chronicle). See Ehrenzweig, supra
note 66, at 859-60.
72. Ehrenzweig provides one example of lightning striking A's land and causing a fire which
spreads to B's land and causes damage. If the lightning could be "traced to a conscious will
to do harm," then A would be held responsible for B's damage. Ehrenzweig, supra note 66,
at 859-60 (citing Tubervil v. Stamp, 91 Eng. Rep. 13 (1698)).
73. Holmes cites the famous examples from Exodus 21:28 of vengeance, and hence blame-
worthiness, on an animal: "If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall
be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten, but the owner of the ox shall be quit."
HOLMES, supra note 21, at 7. See also Wigmore, supra note 66, at 327.
74. This primitive notion of attributing responsibility to an inanimate object was linked
to early ideas of causation. Holmes artfully explains the concept of revenge on inanimate ob-
jects as one of personification:
Learned men have been ready to find a reason in the personification of inanimate
nature common to savages and children. . .'. Without such a personification, anger
towards lifeless things would have been transitory, at most. It is noticeable that
the commonest example in the most primitive customs and laws is that of a tree
which falls upon a man, or from which he falls and is killed. . . . [The tree] was
delivered to the relatives, or chopped to pieces for the gratification of a real or
simulated passion.
• . . [L]iability seems to have been regarded as attached to the body doing the
damage, in an almost physical sense. . . .The hatred for anything giving us pain,
which wreaks itself on the manifest cause, and which leads even civilized men to
kick a door when it pinches his finger, is embodied in . . . early Roman law.
HOLMES, supra note 21, at 11-12 (footnote citations omitted). Examples of inanimate objects
being surrendered or abandoned include a tree which fell and killed someone, a well where
someone drowned, a penknife or sword which an attacker used, and a steam-engine. Id. at
24-25. See also id. at 26-30 (treatment of a ship as the "most living" and, therefore, most
personified inanimate object); Wigmore, supra note 66, at 328-29 (personified objects include
beams to a house, weapons which have injured or killed, and sickles and axes).
75. See HOLMES, supra note 21, at 15-17.
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over his possessions by "buying the vengeance off."'" Because a slave or
animal" was often more valuable to the owner than payment for the injury,
compensation permitted the owner to protect his property interests." Oliver
Wendell Holmes noted that there is some scant history that makes this rule
applicable to inanimate objects; 9 however, the expansion of liability theory
to include general personal liability likely stunted the growth and focus of
this particular area of the law because the development of general personal
liability obviated the need to go after the object. As society became more
civilized, compensation was more accepted, and the owner of the child, slave,
animal, or inanimate object causing the injury eventually lost the choice of
surrender and was forced to compensate the injured.8 0 Consequently, the
idea of surrendering the person or object was forgotten.8
Nonetheless, early notions of liability for the injury continued to be based
upon vengeance and moral blame which, according to Holmes, pre-dated
notions of responsibility based upon the fault of the owner.8" Liability based
upon vengeance and blame was associated with the object doing the harm.
Therefore, the owner of the object was sued only when he had possession
of the object. Liability followed the object, and the "action followed the
guilty thing into whosesoever hands it came." 8 3
Because at early common law ownership and control were strictly con-
strued, vengeance was appropriate only if there was both current ownership
and control.8 ' Yet, the notion of vengeance soon expanded to include persons
other than owners, such as shipowners and innkeepers.85 Eventually, this
76. Id. at 15.
77. Id. at 8.
78. Id. at 10.
79. Holmes cites Roman law for the proposition that vengeance on inanimate objects could
be satisfied by payment. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 15.
81. The development of a compensation scheme to buy off vengeance, Holmes remarks,
became a general custom. Over time the custom developed into a rule which was accepted
and, for the most part, remained unquestioned. This process of acceptance of the compensa-
tion rule, Holmes argues, laid the foundation for the new legal form of general personal liability
in which masters became liable for the torts committed by their servants. Thus, the narrow
and limited privilege of buying off vengeance developed into a generally accepted rule which
eventually evolved into a well recognized legal principle. See supra note 21 (Holmes' theory
on the evolution of legal principles).
82. HOLMES, supra note 21, at 9.
83. Id. at 10. Holmes sums this concept up eloquently:
All this shows very clearly that the liability of the owner was merely a way of
getting at the slave or animal which was the immediate cause of the offence. In
other words, vengeance on the immediate offender was the object of the Greek
and early Roman process, not indemnity from the master or owner. The liability
of the owner was simply a liability of the offending thing.
Id.
84. See id.
85. The transition from surrendering the culpable object or person to imposing liability
on the owner was gradual. First, masters became personally liable for those acts of their slaves
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expansion developed into the doctrine of respondeat superior which renders
employers generally liable for the actions of their employees. 6 The develop-
ment of these later doctrines moved tort law further away from the notion
that a "man actled] at his peril." '8 7 The reality of an employer-employee
relationship could no longer be viewed as involving a property right such
as that in a master-slave or owner-object relationship. As the notion of
liability expanded, however, the prerequisite for liability remained. That is,
to place the agent in the chain of causation, he had to have some direct
contact with, or control over, the object causing the injury.
In sum, the cause in fact requirement can be traced to the desire for
vengeance. This desire for vengeance resulted in the need to identify the
person committing the harmful act or possessing the harmful object. Respon-
sibility for the injury was associated with causation, both because the object
itself was blamed for the harm and because the owner had control over the
object doing the harm. Without these relationships, vengeance would not
come about and liability would not attach.
THE BURDEN OF PROVING CAUSE IN FACT
The burden of proving cause in fact arises from what may be the last
vestiges of a system of laws that placed primary emphasis on the rights of
the individual. 8 An individual will not be held responsible for injuries to
in which the master had knowledge of such wrongdoing. HOLMES, supra note 21, at 15. Once
the transition to personal liability was made, albeit to an extremely limited situation, this idea
was expanded to find shipowners and innkeepers personally liable for the acts of their employees.
The primary force behind this expansion was the need for recourse for wrongs committed in
situations where public trust in the individuals involved was high. Id. at 15-16. Holmes singled
out this transition as probably having the largest impact on the development of tort liability,
for it was at this stage that unconditional liability was imposed for acts done without the owner's
knowledge, and it was the first time that a master or employer was held accountable for the
acts of another free man-one "who was also answerable himself ...before the law." Id.
at 16. See also T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 480-82 (5th ed. 1956)
(discussion of medieval origins of liability of common carriers and innkeepers) [hereinafter cited
as PLUCKNETT].
86. Holmes remarks on the evolution of the doctrine of respondeat superior:
[Tlhe principle introduced on special grounds in a special case, when servants were
slave, is now the general law of this country and England, and under it men daily
have to pay large sums for other people's acts, in which they had no part and
for which they are in no sense to blame.
HOLMES, supra note 21, at 16-17. See also PLUCKNETT, supra note 85, at 475-76 (the acceptance
and codification of the doctrine of respondeat superior in English law can be attributed to
public policy reasons).
87. Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 LAW Q. REv. 37, 38 (1926). Literally,
a person is responsible, Winfield notes, for every "conceivable harm" which he inflicts or
causes; however, that rule is somewhat of a myth because exceptions to the rule such as the
doctrine of proximate cause effectively swallow up the rule. See generally PLUCKNETT, supra
note 85, at 463-65.
88. As Pound observes: "What is peculiar to Anglo-American legal thinking, and above
all to American legal thinking, is an ultra-individualism, an uncompromising insistence upon
individual interests and individual property as the focal point of jurisprudence." PouND, supra
note 21, at 37.
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another unless a relationship between the individual and the injuries is
demonstrated.' In the absence of such proof, respect for a person's
individualism protects him from both harm and responsibility. This protec-
tion of individual rights is founded upon some of the strongest social and
religious movements responsible for developing the common law. In fact,
some suggest that this individualism may even be essential to the working
of the common law. 90
Individualism has been forged into the common law as a result of a number
of dominant forces rooted in the history of the common law. 9' The first,
and perhaps the strongest of these, was the influence of the Puritan tradition
on American and English law. The Puritans relied on the law to protect
the individual from control by the collective authorities.9" Historically,
Puritans reacted strongly to the Anglican Church's self-asserted declaration
of supremacy in biblical interpretation" and rejected the Church's insistence
that it dictate almost every aspect of life.9" Puritan dogma instead emphasized
89. The historical tendency of courts to emphasize the doctrines of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence illustrates the strength of the general common law principle that liability
must be based on a substantial causal relationship between the defendant's action and the plain-
tiff's injuries. The Puritan emphasis on individual freedom played a significant role in the
development of these doctrines. The defendant has an interest, based on his individual right
to be free, not to be held liable for wrongs unless his actions were determined to be a cause
of the injury. Id. at 47-48.
90. The ideas and principles that laid the foundation of the Anglo-American legal system
were those of Germanic law. Adherence to the notion of strict individualism was a pervasive
characteristic of Germanic legal traditions, and the German law considered man to act with
"his eyes open" and capable of caring for himself. It insisted upon full and exact performance
of legal duties, including abiding by the consequences of one's own acts. Remnants of the
spirit of this strict law may be found in the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. Id. at 13-20.
91. See id. at 42-45 (discussion of the effects of individualism on the common law and
on early American legal structures).
92. Coercion by authorities was inconsistent with the Puritan's belief in the supremacy of
individual will. According to the Puritan's view, communities, including political ones, were
established by compact or convenant, rather than by subordination to a superior power. In-
dividuals assenting to the contract agreed to be bound by its fixed and universal rules and
to abide by the consequences of their actions. The law, because it was based on the consent
of the individual and applied inflexibly in accordance with that consent, provided protection
from arbitrary exercise of control by authorities. Id. at 42-45. This Puritan belief strikingly
parallels the contract theory expounded upon by John Locke. See infra notes 135-41 and ac-
companying text.
93. For a discussion of the definition and significance of Puritanism, see D. LITrLE, RELIGION,
ORDER AND LAW (1969) [hereinafter cited as LiTTtE]. This work is a fascinating examination
of the religious philosophies of John Calvin and the Elizabethan Puritans, and how they gave
birth to a "new order." The new order was built on the new found conscience of man. It
was believed that not only the clergy, but each man carried God's laws in his "heart," and
that society was to be ordered around the voluntary obedience to those laws. This new order
challenged the joint venture of Anglicanism and the Crown, and eventually led to civil war
in England. See id. at 33-132. See also PLUCKNETT, supra note 85, at 53 (Plucknett briefly
describes the beginning of the civil war, including the influence of religious dissent).
94. Although the Puritans believed that secular authority should be subservient to religious
law and that such authority should support the church, they also maintained that the functions
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the freedom of individual conscience, individual biblical interpretation, and
free speech." The Puritans demanded that the law free them from the
political-legal coercion of collective authority.
6
Puritan ideas of individual supremacy also were manifested in laws that
permitted a person to freely contract for rights and duties." This idea
of freedom to contract would later dominate jurisprudential thought in
the courts.95 Any authority, especially the law, that affected the safety,
morals, or well-being of the individual was met with hostility. Regulation
of the individual was considered meddlesome and an imposition upon the
rights of man. 9
The impact of this Puritan quest for individualism has had a significant
effect on the common law doctrines that exist today.' 0 For example, doctrines
of church and state should be kept distinct. Furthermore, the Puritans steadfastly believed that
the church should not use coercion or become involved in civil affairs. Rather, Puritan philosophy
generally held that voluntary consent of individuals, not force, should bind the community
together. See LITTLE, supra note 93, at 84-131.
95. The conscience, Little notes, was seen by Puritans as the spiritual intermediary between
God and man. Only when man's conscience was free from constraint, such as coercive state
authority, could man fully effectuate God's will in achieving the "right order." Id. at 114-15.
See POUND, supra note 21, at 45.
96. Indeed, it was not unusual for a Puritan to "disobey the law of the land if in his
judgment the end of the law (the purpose of God) is advanced by his action." LITTLE, supra
note 93, at 125 (emphasis in original). Thus, an unrestricted, unconstrained conscience was
a necessary prerequisite in the Puritan religion, and the legal structure surrounding the Puritans
was secondary to the will of God.
97. Freedom to contract went hand-in-hand with the Puritan's notion of individualism. Only
when the conscience was free from coercive restraints was it able to freely and fully enter
into a meeting of the minds. Thus, the Puritans valued the ability to freely conduct their own
business and marital contractual relations. ld. at 204-05, 257-58. Pound noted the importance
of freedom to contract in Puritan law:
[T~he conception of a maximum of abstract individual self-assertion exempt from
social control, to which his vigorous and learned opinions gave currency, is essen-
tial to the Puritan conception of consociation. We are to be with one another but
not over one another. The whole is to have no right of control over the individual
beyond the minimum necessary to keep the peace. Everything else is to be left to
the free contract of a free man.
POUND, supra note 21, at 49. See generally P. REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN COLONIES 54 (1899) [hereinafter cited as REINSCH].
98. Although Puritan law had long before embodied the principle of freedom to contract,
American constitutional law did not embrace this notion of "liberty to contract" until the
turn of the century. POUND, supra note 21, at 48-49. Pound further states that Puritans re-
jected the rise of equity, for it was through equity in which a person's bad decisions were
rectified. The Puritans preferred to see poorly informed or otherwise incapable business per-
sons face the "consequences of their folly." Id. at 53.
99. The Puritan man was to be free from constraints to enable him to "freely yield[ J
subjection to the will of God .. " LITTLE, supra note 93, at 115 (quoting Perkin, II, 276).
But see M. WALZER, THE REVOLUTION OF THE SAINTS: A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS OF RADICAL
POLITICS (1965) (Puritan leaders believed they could acquire political power through a highly
disciplined society).
100. Although no single doctrine can account for the entire shaping of the common law,
Pound suggests that Puritanism, has been a "controlling factor" because of its unique em-
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such as assumption of risk and contributory negligence have been attributed
to Puritan influence on the law.'"' Under these doctrines, an employer is
held responsible only if its actions prove to be the cause of the injury and
the employee has not in any way culpably participated in the actions.' 2 Thus,
before liability will be imposed the employee must prove that a strong causal
relationship exists between the employer's actions and the injury.' 3
Because of the Puritan's distrust of authority, law influenced by Puritanism
denied judicial discretion to impinge upon both the individual's freedom from
liability and the freedom to secure one's own safety.' 4 Rather, Puritan law' 5
phasis on the assertion of "ultra-individualism"--the strong feeling of a man's independence
and freedom from oppressive societal constraints. POUND, supra note 21, at 36-37. See supra
note 88.
101. See supra note 89.
102. According to Puritanism, an employee had no recourse against an employer for injuries
stemming from dangerous aspects of the work performed or from a co-employee's negligence.
Under either circumstance, the employee knew of and assumed these risks of employment.
POUND, supra note 21, at 47-48. The unwillingness of the courts during the turn of the century
to depart from these Puritan influenced doctrines is evidenced by their reluctance to faithfully
apply the non-contributory negligence law embodied in the workers' compensation statutes.
See infra note 103.
103. Pound notes that the Massachusetts legislature, strongly influenced by Puritan thought,
drafted statutes incorporating the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence:
It is not an accident that the classical exposition of this doctrine was penned in
Massachusetts. Again, a workman, engaged constantly upon a machine, so that
he comes to be a part of it and to operate mechanically himself, omits a precaution
and is injured. The common law says to him, "You are a free man, you have
a mind and are capable of using it; you chose freely to do a dangerous thing and
were injured; you must abide by the consequences." As a matter of fact, it may
well be he did not and could not choose freely. Before the days of workmen's
compensation it was said that statistics showed the great majority of industrial ac-
cidents happened in the last working hour of the day, when the faculties were numbed
and the operator had ceased to be the free agent which our theory contemplated.
But there was no escape from the legal theory. That very condition was a risk
of the employment, and was assumed by the laborer. Legislation had been chang-
ing these rules, yet courts long had a tendency to read the doctrine of contributory
negligence into the statutes even where the legislature had tried to get rid of it.
POUND, supra note 21, at 48. In short, the Puritan view required that the harmful act stem
from an individual's conduct to be actionable. The individual was responsible only if he caused
the harm; otherwise, the person harmed was viewed as the cause of his injury.
104. Id. at 55. Puritan distrust of the magistrate also stemmed from an unwillingness to
permit a political state to interfere with the process of becoming a self-reliant man. The very
recognition by the Puritans of a state which had control over them, however, appears to be
contradictory to the principles of Puritanism which emphasized the freedom of the individual's
conscience to determine the best way to live. Indeed, Pound regarded the Puritan man as one
whose conscience would not allow him to be judged by the "discretion of men," but rather
by the will of God. Id. at 50-51. Little, however, in an elaborate discussion of these apparent
contradictions, finds an underlying consistency. The Puritan viewed life as being divided into
two spheres: first, the "inward" life-that affected by the will of God-in which no man-made
laws could "transcend," and second, the "outward" life-that affected and governed by the
state. LrrrLE, supra note 93, at 123.
105. The Puritan influence contributed to the development of American judicial procedure,
which is dominated by an abundance of rules. The Puritans conceived of the ideal judge as
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required that some type of causation be established before an individual's
freedom could be infringed. Eighteenth and nineteenth century tort and
criminal law is illustrative of this Puritan influence. 0 6 Puritianism, as Pound
stated:
expresse[d] the feeling of the self-reliant man that he is to make his own
bargains and determine upon his own acts and control his own property,
accepting the responsibility that goes with such power, subjecting himself
to liability for the consequences of his free choice, but exempt from inter-
ference in making his choice.
0 7
From this Puritan perspective, a present day products liability situation
might have been resolved in the following manner. The plaintiff freely con-
tracted with the seller of the product. Accordingly, the plaintiff must accept
responsibility for the consequences of his actions, and the law and the courts
should not infringe on the rights of the plaintiff to buy or the right of the
defendant to sell a product. The courts would have no discretion to rule
otherwise because a court's .primary purpose would be "to bring about a
maximum of individual self-assertion."'' 08 The Puritanical notion of in-
dividualism was certainly a prime force behind the development of cause
in fact, as evidenced by the present day plaintiff's burden to prove cause
in fact. The plaintiff not only had the burden of proving cause in fact but
also had to be free from any contributory negligence before the law would
interfere with a defendant's life and property.
A second force of individualism influencing the development of cause
in fact stemmed from the English court battles with the Crown in the
seventeenth century.'0 ' The king claimed that his authority arose from
God, and thus, the Crown was the supreme governing authority."' This
a "human machine," bound by rigid rules of evidence and subject to detailed review by a
series of tribunals. Legal formulas were considered essential in Puritan law to insure fairness
for the individual and to minimize judicial discretion. POUND, supra note 21, at 55-57. See
C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW-TORT AND CONTRACT 154-83 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as FIFooT].
106. For a discussion of the influence of Puritanism on the criminal law, see POUND, supra
note 21, at 49-51. Pound specifically notes the Puritan objection to individualized punishments
because of the belief that man should be judged by the "inflexible rule of the strict law,"
rather than by the discretion of the state or its representatives. Id. at 51. In the area of tort
liability, Fifoot provides a sampling of cases in this period that clearly show the rise of the
doctrine of negligence. See FtooT, supra note 105, at 164-66. One such example involves the
evolution of the doctrine of common law bailment. Bailment cases provide an interesting scenario
concerning the cause in fact requirement because liability arises due to the bailor's possession
of the object, and the presumption arises that a bailee, by virtue of his possession, has suffi-
cient control over the object to hold him legally liable to the bailor for any loss. See generally
HOLMES, supra note 21, at 164-205 (discussion of the development of common law bailment);
PLUCKNETT, supra note 85, at 476-80 (same).
107. POUND, supra note 21, at 50.
108. Id. at 59.
109. See id. at 60-84.
110. In the early part of the seventeenth century, the Crown secured a strong foothold in
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claim of ultimate authority, however, was challenged by jurists and the
common law courts."'
One of the king's skirmishes with the court parallels the issues arising
in modern product liability cases. King Henry VI authorized the Company
of Dyers in London to search for and confiscate cloth stained with poisonous
dyes." 2 The court ruled that the king violated the law of the land because
a person's property could not be forfeited without adjudication and an op-
portunity to be heard." 3 In other words, the court denied the Crown the
power to interfere with the individual and his property rights without first
demonstrating that an individual dyer was responsible for the illegal act.
The court protected the dyer's rights at the expense of societal needs. In
balancing the two interests, the need for the individual to be free from in-
trusion superseded the societal need to investigate the illegal activity and
confiscate hazardous products.
As a result of a number of such battles between the courts and the king,
the doctrine of "supremacy of the law""' developed, and the king gradual-
ly succumbed to the law. For the first time, the individual was protected
from the arbitrary and capricious exercises of the king's power even when
it was exercised for the protection of society.' From Lord Coke's perspec-
tive, the king's power was subjected to the law because it needed to be
tempered by rules of reason,"' and these rules were derived from elemen-
its claim to ecclesiastical supremacy as a result of the appointment of John Whitgift as Arch-
bishop of Canterbury in 1583. LITTLE, supra note 93, at 136. According to Whitgift's inter-
pretation of religion and law, "the devine command issues in the existing order and the ex-
isting order gives form and content to the command [and] . . . identification obtains only
when the existing order is under the rulership of a 'Christian prince.' " Id. at 138. The existing
order, of course, was the Crown, and the church itself became subordinate to the "ultimate
• . .power and authority of the crown in ecclesiastical matters .. " Id. at 140.
111. Little writes of Archbishop Grindal, who, in 1576, sent a letter to the Queen stating
that he would not abide by the Queen's command to stop the Puritans from preaching. Grin-
dal also stated that the Queen was subject to God's command in the same fashion as her
subjects. The Queen responded by confining Grindal to his home for over seven years until
his death. Id. at 135. Pound also remarks on a confrontation between King James I and Lord
Coke in which Coke informed the King that he was subject to God and the law of the land.
The King replied by removing Coke from his position as a judge. POUND, supra note 21, at
60-61. In another example, when the King pardoned defendants on a conviction of forcible
disseisen without regard to court form and procedure, the court denied the validity of the
King's act. Id. at 66-67 (uncited case) (King's letter of pardon sent to sheriff did not permit
the sheriff to disobey the law's mandate to execute the writ).
112. Id. at 68-69 (uncited case).
113. Id. at 69.
114. The doctrine of supremacy of law was coined by Pound as follows: "[Tlhe sovereign
[is] bound to act upon principles, not according to arbitrary will; [and is] obliged to
conform to reason, instead of being free to follow caprice." Id. at 64. This doctrine was in
no way destined for its existence; on the contrary, centuries of constant struggle took place
in which the strength of the King's power was challenged. See id. at 69.
115. The courts, during this phase, developed into an institution which guarded "individual
interests against the encroachments of state and of society." Id. at 74.
116. See LITTLE, supra note 93, at 182.
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tary notices of natural law" 7 which emphasized individualism." '
Most of the law that arose during the battles between the Crown and the
court remained as common law and was carried over to America." 9 Instead
of the Crown, however, the American courts battled with the state.' Ideas
such as due process, equal protection, and fundamental rights of. the in-
dividual were protected from the arbitrary and capricious power of the
state.' 2 ' America declared the supremacy of law with new vigor by subjecting
all of its officials to the dictates of the law. Because of the prevailing religious
and philosophical thinking, American law compelled the protection of the
individual's natural rights."'2 These rights evolved to place the burden of
proving the identity of the causal agent in civil actions on the plaintiff.' 3
117. Little quotes from Coke to demonstrate the perfect unity between the common law
and "fundamental" or natural law:
To the end that all Judges and Justices in all the several parts of the realm, might,
as it were, with one mouth in all men's cases pronounce one and the same sentence;
whose learned works are extant, and digested into nine volumes, wherein if you
observe the unity and consent of so many several judges and courts in so many
successions of ages, and the coherence and concordance of such infinite, several
and diverse cases, (one, as it were with sweet consent and amity, proving and ap-
proving another) it may be questioned whether the matter be worthy of greater
admiration or commendation: for as in nature we see the infinite distinction of
things proceed from some unity, as many flowers from one root, many rivers from
one fountain, many arteries in the body of man from one heart . . . so without
question Lex orta cum [ex] mente divina, and this admirable unity and consent
in such diversity of things, proceeds only from God the fountain and founder of
all good laws and constitutions.
Id. at 175 (quoting E. COKE, THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE IN ENGLISH IN THIRTEEN
PARTS COMPLEAT PREFACE TO 2, ii-iii (London 1738) (7 Vols.)). "According to Coke, 'this
admirable unity and consent' is' founded in what he variously calls 'fundamental law,' 'rule
of common law,' or 'common right' that is, in the sum and substance of the ancient law
of the realm." LITTLE, supra note 93, at 175.
118. See infra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
119. See POUND, supra note 21, at 75. But see REINSCH, supra note 97 (English c6mmon
law had little influence in America). See generally PLUCKNETT, supra note 85, at 75-76 (discus-
sion of the historical development of the origins of the common law).
120. See POuND, supra note 21, at 75.
121. Id. at 100-01.
122. In discussing the victory of the supremacy of the law, Pound states:
[The Supremacy] doctrine, therefore, became established among the fundamentals
of our legal tradition as a result of the victory. But the victory gave it a new scope
and a new spirit. Its scope for a time broadened, so as to make of it a doctrine
of limitations upon all sovereign power, independent of positive law and at most
simply declared thereby. Its spirit became individualist. It became a doctrine that
it was the function of the common law and of common-law courts to stand be-
tween the individual and oppressive action by the state; that the courts were set
up and the law existed to guard individual interests against the encroachments of
state and society. . . . Too often it led the law in the last century to stand full-
armored before individuals, natural and artificial, that needed no defence, but sallied
from beneath its aegis to injure society.
Id. at 74. See generally PLUCKNETT, supra note 85, at 243 (discussion of Coke's influence on
the development of the supremacy of law doctrine).
123. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 786 (1972) [hereinafter cited
at MCCORMICKI.
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The legal philosophy that undergirded early common law also emphasized
individualism' 1 and the need for a cause in fact element. Although stem-
ming from many different schools of natural law, 2 ' this philosophy main-
tained that individualism was supreme, and that free and unfettered individual
rights constituted the proper model upon which to base the law. 26
Natural law insisted upon an inquiry into good faith and reason in an
endeavor to make the law more humane and moral. The struggle of natural
law philosophers revolved around their desire to institute individualism
as the rational basis of philosophy so that law and morals could
"coincide."' 2 7 In attempting to combine morality with law, natural law
philosophers insisted that the concept of security be examined and
emphasized.'2 Under natural law,' 29 an aggressor who invaded a person's
security was held liable only if the aggressor either willed the invasion or
breached some rule designed to protect the security of others."' ° Because
this new analysis of security required more than blame, the individual had
greater control over the situations in which he would be liable for someone
else's injury. Natural law, then, can be viewed as also producing the cause
in fact requirement. Implicit in this concept of security is this requirement
that a defendant be identified as the person invading or threatening another's
security before liability could attach.
This natural law analysis of security, and its corresponding emphasis on
124. Blackstone notes that the principal purpose of all human laws is the protection of in-
dividual rights. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 38-43.
125. Pound cites several historical sources in the development of natural law principles which
include the philosophy of Aristotle, the tenets of Roman law, the juristic theory of Grotius,
and the writings of Coke and Blackstone. Two principal theories of natural rights emerged
from these foundations. Both theories held that the primary purpose of law is to protect in-
dividual rights. One theory viewed natural rights as the moral qualities inherent in human beings
which could be identified by making reasoned deductions from human nature. The second theory
based natural rights upon the terms of the social contract entered into by the individual. See
generally POUND, supra note 21, at 85-102; infra notes 135-41.
126. POUND, supra note 21, at 100. See also supra note 124. See generally L. FULLER, THE
MoRALITy OF LAW 96-106 (1964).
127. The natural law period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries represented a period
of liberalization in the law. During this period, proponents of natural law rejected the arbitrary
exercise of power, inflexible rules, and uniformity that characterized the period of "strict law,"
in favor of emphasizing reason, morality, ethical justice, and duty. See POUND, supra note
21, at 140-41.
128. As natural law theory became embodied in legal systems, certain qualities of the "strict
law" were carried over to restrict judicial discretion in the administration of the laws. The
development of the concepts of equality and security illustrate this "maturing" of the legal
process. Both the strict rule that the same remedy be applied in similar situations, and the
liberal view that all individuals have the same status under the law, contributed to the emphasis
on equality. The concept of security buttressed this emphasis on equality by demanding that
legal results should be determined by individual will and intention. Id. at 142-43.
129. Natural law separated the concept of security into two elements. The first element of
the concept of security was that all individual interests should be protected from external op-
pression. Second, an individual was only accountable to others by making a willful choice to
do so or by violating the security interests of another. Id.
130. Id.
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individualism, established certain fundamental rights of property and
contract. 3 ' This, in turn, led to the formation of the Bill of Rights, the
basis of American liberties.' 2 Pound found security and liberty to be closely
interconnected:
Liberty .. .mean[t] in the nineteenth century . .. that the individual
shall not be held legally unless for a fault, unless for an act on his part
that infringes another's right, and that another shall not be permitted to
exact of him except as and to the extent he was willed a relation to which
the law in advance attached such power to exact.'33
This notion of the protection of individual liberties added to the develop-
ment of imposing the burden of proof of fault and causation on the plaintiff.'34
In addition to Puritanism, the battles between the court and the Crown,
and natural law, two other forces in the common law led to the develop-
ment of the cause in fact requirement in tort law: the political theory of
social contract and the influence of the frontier and pioneer family. The
socio-political philosophy of John Locke, embodied in his theory of social
contract, pervades American common law.' 33 The theory of social contract
131. The protection of the individual's interest in acquisitions was recognized as an important
guarantee within the natural law concept of security. The power to freely contract was con-
sidered an asset or property interest deserving of legal protection. Therefore, acquisitions ob-
tained by the individual through exercise of the contract right was secured by law. Id. at 144.
See generally Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pt.
1), 42 HAgv. L. REV. 149 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Corwin].
132. The guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights to insure both equality and security were
consistent with natural law's emphasis on the importance of maximizing individual rights. See
POUND, supra note 21, at 143.
133. Id. (emphasis added). For further discussion of natural law theory influence on the
United States Constitution and civil law, see Corwin, supra note 131, at 383, 405-06. Two
commentators suggest that moral fault may not have been a necessary prerequisite for liability
under natural law, but both suggest the necessity of proving causation. See Brown, The Natural
Law Basis of Juridical Institutions in the Anglo-American Legal System, 4 CATH. U.L. REV.
81, 84-86 (1953-54); Lucey, Liability Without Fault and the Natural Law, 24 TENN. L. REV.
952, 960-62 (1957).
134. See MCCORMICK, supra-note 123, at 786-89. McCormick, in commenting on the distribu-
tion of burdens, recognized the "natural tendency to place the burdens on the party desiring
change." Id. at 788-89. Because the plaintiff generally seeks to change the present state of
affairs, McCormick reasons that he should bear the risk of failure of proof. Id. at 786.
135. See J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1924), reprinted in part in THE
TRADITION OF FREEDOM pt. 2, at 1-80 (M. Mayer ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as TRADITION].
Locke wrote that each individual submits himself to the will of the majority because of the
original compact through which society was formed. Id. at 28. See also Rose, The Law of
Nature: An Introduction to American Legal Philosophy, 13 OHIO ST. L.J. 121, 136-40 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Rose]. Rose stated that Locke's theories "[o]riginally intended as a justifica-
tion for a limited sovereignty and the guarantee of individual rights of man which it is the
function of civil government to protect,... have supported not only the aims of the Founding
Fathers, but the rise of capitalistic democracy in industrial America." Id. at 138. Another com-
mentator suggested that the social contract theory, which maximized individualism, is eroding:
The individualistic philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries proceeded from the
idea that the human individual was sovereign, i.e., of the highest value. From this
it was concluded that a social order can be binding on the individual only when
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states that individuals joined with each other to form a "contract" to establish
a government, 3 , and this government, through the collective will of the
people, protects an individual's inherent rights.' 37 The terms of the social
contract were discoverable by examining those rights inherent and vital to
each individual, and Locke declared that the government could not deprive
the people of these rights.' 38 Central to the theory of social contract was
the notion that the government was not the source of the people's power;
rather, the people were the source of the government's power.' 39 The social
contract theory, therefore, substantially restricted the government's power
over the individual." 0
Arguably, this political philosophy would require the plaintiff to show a
strong causal element to protect the individual defendant. In social contract
terminology, an individual would not enter into a contract whereby his in-
dividual rights and protections later could be altered without the accuser
first demonstrating that he was the cause in fact of the injury."'
it is recognized by the individual as binding. From this came the doctrine of the
social contract, which still has its exponents; but today the inclination is rather
to a universalistic philosophy of values according to which the community is superior
to the individual.
Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARv. L. REv. 44, 69 (1941).
136. See TRADITION, supra note 135, pt. 2, ch. VIII, at 27-28.
137. See TITIoN, supra note 135, pt. 2, ch. X1, at 39-44. Locke wrote that in the original
contract, man was willing to leave the freedom he enjoyed in the state of nature to join with
others "for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates. ... Id. at 36. Among
the needs Locke found lacking in the state of nature were "established, settled, known law,
• . . indifferent judge[s] with authority to determine all differences according to the established
law . . . [and the] power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due
execution. Id. at 36-37.
138. See TRADITION, supra note 135, pt. 2, ch. IX, at 37-38. Locke suggested that man would
not have entered into this original contract if it were to his detriment, therefore, "the power
of the . . . legislature . . . can never . . . extend farther than the common good." Id. at
37. See also Rose, supra note 135, at 137 (Rose interpreted Locke's theory to embody the
notion that rulers were empowered to follow established law, and the "people may resist an
unlawful abuse of power").
139. Augmenting this view was Locke's insistence on man's right to property. See TRAci-
TION, supra note 135, pt. 2, ch. V, at 11-14. Locke wrote that man gained the right to property
because he labored on, and improved the condition of, the property and that God gave the
land to the "industrious and rational-and labour was to be his title to it-not to the fancy
or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious." Id. at 12. See also Rose, supra note
135, at 137 (Rose interprets Locke's position as requiring that legislative and executive powers
be accountable to the people, and that the executive function be "inferior to the legislature,"
or representative body of the people).
140. Under Locke's theory, the people have the right to judge whether the ruler has acted
against their trust, for it is the people who originally bestowed the trust in the ruler. The
people may remove the ruler or legislature from power, elect a new ruler or legislature, or
change the form of government. TRADITION, supra note 135, pt. 2, ch. XIX, at 79-80. See
also Rose, supra note 135, at 137 (governments have no absolute power, according to Locke,
and thus arbitrary deprivation of property or taxation without consent of the public cannot
be permitted).
141. The defendant's reaction that "we didn't bargain for" liability without proof of causa-
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Finally, the cause in fact element, grounded in individualism, was further
encouraged by the spirit of the American pioneer.' 2 Americans in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were "self-made" persons.'" 3 Fron-
tier people were independent explorers who generally found, cleared, and
farmed their own land.'" Because of the abundance of land, they often were
isolated from others and were forced to depend upon themselves for
survival.'4 1 In the vastness of the frontier, the pioneer had little use for the
courts or the law'" except when occasional outbursts of violence struck the
community.'" Because of this independence from the legal system, the in-
dividual was, for the most part, forced to fend for himself whenever injury
occurred. As a result, the pioneer often lived with the results of his own
tion is supported by due process concepts, which, in turn, are derived largely from social con-
tract theory. See generally Corwin, supra note 131, at 388-94. Corwin contrasts Hobbes, the
author of Leviathan (1651), with Locke, and finds that Hobbes views natural and civil law
as coextensive: that rights are "implements of public policy. Locke, on the other hand, regards
government as creative of no rights, but as strictly fiduciary in character, and as designed
to make more secure and more readily available rights which antedate it and which would
survive it." Id. at 389.
142. See generally POUND, supra note 21, at 112-38. Pound remarked on the pioneer spirit:
There was a "frontier repugnance to scientific law [highly educated bar and the insistence
of the pioneer that his judges decide offhand without study of what other judges may have
done in European monarchies. ... Id. at 118. However, aversion to this arbitrary form
of law, coupled with distrust of governmental action, motivated those who formulated the legal
system to attempt to establish a detailed system of rules so that the judge would have little
discretion. The philosophy of the pioneer, according to Pound, was that "[i]f men had to
be governed, it must be by known rules of the law." Id. at 119.
143. See R. MORRIS, STUDIES AND HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 17-21 (2d ed. 1959) [hereinafter
cited as MoRsus]. The frontier environment, Morris remarks, contributed to the development
of the self-made person: "in the seventeenth century American law wai born. It grew amid
the surroundings of the first American frontier which nurtured self assertion and independence."
Id. at 17.
144. As a result, individualism thrived. The pioneer saw prosperity as a by-product of deter-
mined, strong individual effort. POUND, supra note 21, at 126-27. Those in the "outposts of
civilization," according to Pound, did not "tolerate anything which [stood] for discipline, good
order and obedience; and the man who lets another command him they despise[d]." Id. at
117 (quoting Orvin Wister). Partly because of the economic success of this formative period,
many of the frontier doctrines survived well past the simple days of the agrarian society. Id.
at 130.
145. As the population moved westward, English influence over these colonies decreased ac-
cordingly, which caused the frontier person to feel even less bound by the constraints of
established legal systems. Id. at 119.
146. The pioneer was most concerned with limiting governmental interference with his in-
dependence. Protection of his general security was tolerated, but the nineteenth century American
living on a self-sufficient farm wanted minimal interference from the goverment. See id.
147. The pioneer permitted "governmental machinery .... civil and criminal tribunals and
rules and standards of decision to be applied therein," but only to the extent that they pro-
tected his general security. Id. Pound states that even in the criminal law, the colonists gave
"excessive power to juries" and limited the trial judge's power "to control the trial." Id. at
123. This was a result of the colonists' memories of the "harsh and brutal" law of England
and the politicalization of the criminal law in English courts. Id. at 122.
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misfortune, even though his only mistake may have been the inability to
anticipate another individual's harmful conduct.' 8
The law of the frontier further exemplified this individualism. The elements
required for a cause of action limited the judge's discretion, thereby protect-
ing the individual from the state's intrusion.' 9 The plaintiff was required
to prove the identity of the cause of the harm.' 0 This cause in fact require-
ment safeguarded the individual from both speculation and the judge's
predisposition against a particular person."'The five forces of individualism underlying American common law-
Puritanism, the battles between the court and the Crown, natural law, social
contract, and the frontier spirit-are collectively responsible for the require-
ment that the plaintiff prove cause in fact. In cases that do not require proof
of cause in fact before imposing liability, these forces suggest the negative
response that the courts have gone "too far." Without proof of cause in
fact, responsibility for the wrong seems to be lacking because either cause
in fact is implicit in the notion of responsibility or it is intrinsically a
minimum definition of liability. Without this requirement, there is arguably
a violation of the individual's rights and liberties that lie at the foundation
of America's independence. Furthermore, an argument can be made that
without the cause in fact requirement, there would be a violation of the
social contract between individuals and their government when liability would
be imposed without causation.
The history of common law, however, is not exclusively contained in these
five forces. There are other forces which support the imposition of liability
absent the cause in fact element. One such force is identified by commen-
tators as the force of status liability, which was a remnant of the feudal
days of early England.' As will be discussed, the identification of the decline
148. Id. at 135.
149. Id. at 119-20. According to Pound, the problem of developing rules which would meet
the needs of the American people and also limit the discretion of the magistrate "determined
the whole course of our legal development until the last quarter of the nineteenth century."
Id. at 120.
150. In a group of cases reviewed in the early colonial period, all required that the plaintiff
allege the identity of the person or animal that inflicted the harm, or identify the master who
owned the slave. For a survey of early tort cases, see MoRIus, supra note 143, at 201-58.
151. See PoUND, supra note 21, at 116-20.
152. See Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New
Industrial State, 55 CAIru. L. REv. 1247, 1249 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Tobriner & Grodin].
The authors contended that the common law has reacted to the increasing organization of society
by reactivating status relationships, and in particular, status relationships implicating organiza-
tions affecting the public interest. Id. In the past, such enterprises as blacksmiths, purveyors
of food, veterinarians, tailors, common carriers, and innkeepers were seen to have placed
themselves in the public limelight as providers of services. The common law imposed obliga-
tions on these enterprises including "the duty to serve all customers on reasonable terms without
discrimination and the duty to provide the kind of product or service reasonably to be expected
from their economic role." Id. at 1250.
Fifoot likewise suggests that certain higher duties were demanded of businesses because of
their common or "public calling." Fifoot lists a number of examples of common callings which
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of cause in fact based on this historical vestige of status is not clear because
status liability traditionally has insisted upon strong, simple causation
elements.' Status liability, however, may provide some understanding of
how the common law can encompass a concept of liability which does not
require proof of cause in fact.
FORCES AGAINST THE CAUSE IN FACT REQUIREMENT
Status in Tort Liability
Common law liability based on duties owed to another because of one's
relational status originated in feudal landlord-tenant law.'"" The idea that
each man should stand on his own and "play the game as a man, without
squealing,"' 55 did not override certain feudal duties. The feudal relationship
determined the nature of the duties and responsibilities. Specifically, the tenant
owed duties of service and fealty to the lord, and the lord owed protection
and warranty to the tenant.
Other early common law relationships also created duties which initially
overrode developing individualistic tendencies in the common law. The
relationship of master-servant,'5 6 parent-child,"' mortgagor-mortgagee,' 5' and
common carrier-consumer 9 were among a few of the common law relation-
give rise to higher duties: carriers, innkeepers, surgeons and veterinary surgeons, the smith
or ferrier, and to a lesser degree, the ferryman, carpenter, shepherd, and barber. FiFOOT, supra
note 105, at 157 (citing Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 LAW
Q. REv. 184, 185-90 (1926)).
153. See Rintala, The Supreme Court of California, 1968-1969-Foreward: "Status" Con-
cepts in the Law of Torts, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 80 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rintalal. Tradi-
tional negligence law, according to Rintala, focuses on the plaintiff, whereas the " 'status'
approach focuses upon the defendants, not the particular plaintiff." Id. at 86. Rintala states
that the focus of the status approach is now "upon the role voluntarily assumed by the defen-
dant and the defendant's relationship, arising out of the role assumed, to the general class
of persons who may be affected by one who plays such a role." Id.
154. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 152, at 1249. For a discussion of status concepts
and the development of contract law, see H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (1930) (societal relation-
ships historically have affected legal relationships particularly in the area of contract law);
Graveson, The Movement From Status to Contract, 4 MOD. L. REv. 261 (1941) (there is an
increasing emphasis on status in modern contractual relations).
155. POUND, supra note 21, at 20. Individualism had no place in the feudal legal system.
The assignment of rights, duties, and liabilities were not made according to one's undertakings
or actions, but rather according to his status as landlord or tenant. Id.
156. Id. at 29.
157. Id. at 27.
158. In mortgagor-mortgagee relationships, the common law courts tended to apply rules
based on the perceived relationship of the parties, rather than on their interests as manifested
in the terms of their contract. Id. at 24.
159. See Jackson v. Rogers, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (K.B. 1683) (refusal of defendant carrier to
haul goods brought by plaintiff is actionable as would be the refusal of an innkeeper to pro-
vide lodging for a guest or the refusal of a blacksmith to shoe a horse); HOLmEs, supra note
21, at 183-205 (Holmes declared that the legal duties of common carriers result from obliga-
tions attached by custom or law to particular "public callings" and from the principles of
bailment). For examples of "public callings" that were given special duties, see generally J.
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ships which created responsibilities based on status. Inherent in the concept
of status liability was a perceived public need giving rise to a heightened
duty. The resulting responsibility or liability was not based on fault, will,
or intent, but rather was based on the status of the person. 160
These common law ideas of status liability were gradually suppressed in
the 1800's by forces maximizing individualism.' 6 ' Sir Henry Maine identified
this suppression as an evolving societal process moving from status to
contract. 6 ' Based on his study of law and evolution, he concluded that
American law gradually was perfecting an ideology of man's individual
rights.' 63 Other commentators viewed status liability as the antithesis of
freedom, and contract as freedom's synthesis.'" Indeed, status liability often
was blamed for the degradation of individual freedom.
Yet, as cities grew and the industrialization of America unfolded, the
equality inherent in the simple agrarian society of the early pioneer life
suddenly was transformed into a society dominated by strong collective forces
over the individual."" Society's industrialization and corresponding growth
of the cities altered life styles and forced people to become more dependent
upon each other for their subsistence.' 66 The maximization of individualism,
BEALE & B. WYMAs, CASES ON PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANIES: PUBLIC CARRIERS, PUBLIC WORKS,
AND OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES (1902).
160. Social positions carried with them certain legal rights and obligations. Because an in-
dividual did not assume his status voluntarily, he had no control over the resulting legal con-
sequences. Thus, individual choice played no part in the assignment of responsibility in feudal
law. Because this system prevented the individual from controlling his liability, it served as
a deterrent to individual initiative. See Rintala, supra note 153, at 83-84.
161. The development of a mercantile economy and its accompanying laissez-faire philosophy
were two important factors leading to an increased recognition of individualism. The emergence
of the right to contract liberated individuals from the constraints of status relationships and
enabled them to create rights and duties through the exercise of free will. This new power
to establish individual relationships did not extend to common carriers, however, whose obliga-
tions were still determined in accordance with their status. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note
152, at 1251.
162. See H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (F. Pollock ed. 1906).
163. Id. at 302.
164. As summarized by Rintala, contract law and liability based on fault furthered the values
of maximizing individual freedom and encouraging economic progress by limiting liability to
those situations in which the individual caused the harm to another or failed to perform a
voluntarily assumed obligation which resulted in harm. Status, on the other hand, impeded
both of those values. Imposing liability without fault restricted individual freedom and deterred
individual initiative. Rintala, supra note 153, at 83-84.
165. The mass production, marketing, and distribution of goods and services is not consis-
tent with the view of a laissez-faire economy consisting of a series of individual contracts reflecting
the will of the consumer. Individual freedom has also been restricted by the controlling in-
fluence of unions and professional societies. Because these organizations were considered, in
some cases, as quasi-public in nature, courts have revived status concepts to impose obligations
upon them based upon duties owed to the public and individuals with whom they deal. See
Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 152, at 1251-53.
166. Modern society brings individuals into routine contact with various institutions as a
matter of social and economic necessity. Dependency upon these institutions creates relation-
ships in which expectations and customs develop, and the protection of public expectations
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which had becorne an ingrained philosophy on the frontier, now became
a basic tenet only of groups possessing great wealth and superior bargaining
power. '1 The result of this urban transformation was an economic and moral
injustice toward certain groups in society such as tenants, employees, and
consumers.' 8 The law gradually responded, however, returning to the idea
of status liability for the justification of imposing higher duties for the pro-
tection of the individual. 1 9 Responsibility for safety and protection was placed
upon an individual defendant without regard to his will to act.' 0
by enforcing customary standards of conduct would amount to reintroducing status as a basis
of liability-rights and obligations would be imposed according to the relation between the
parties, not by any voluntary act or agreement. The standardization of contracts, for example
insurance policies, has eroded the -principle of freedom of contract and has also provided an
impetus toward the revival of status liability. See Rintala, supra note 153, at 91-93.
167. Large economic enterprises, unions, and professional organizations, according to Tobriner
and Grodin, are able to exercise much power over individuals. These organizations may repre-
sent the only source of essential commodities and may provide the only means by which an
individual can pursue his chosen trade or profession and attain personal security. The individual
has little ability to influence these organizations, and it is the view of these commentators
that the belief that such organizations are voluntary associations of persons whose freedom
should be maximized may be erroneous because they actually operate to restrict the individual
freedom of their members. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 152, at 1254-56.
168. The ability of the modern organization to act arbitrarily and impose its will upon in-
dividuals constitutes a sharp curtailment of the progress toward individual rights represented
by the advent of contract law. The individual is, in many situations, no longer "free" to bargain
and create rights and duties for himself. Id. at 1251-55.
169. See Rintala, supra note 153, at 95-132 (discussion of California cases explicitly or im-
plicitly adopting the "new" status approach to tort liability). It is important to note that the
"newer" concept of liability based on status is different from the status liability of feudal
days. The emphasis on status in' feudal times seemed to focus on the plaintiff, and looked
to his right to a cause of action based on his status. The notion of privity in negligence law
has been identified as a remnant of this status relationship requirement. The status concept
in feudal law protected the defendants-often those who were more powerful-because of the
lack of status of the plaintiff. The newer status concept looks more to the role, position, and
relation of the defendant. The difference lies in the analysis. The courts first determine the*
defendant's role, which is an attribute one acquires rather than is born with, and then ascertain
the defendant's relationship to the general class of persons who may be affected. The status
concept of liability is a possible source of the relaxation of the fault and proximate cause
concepts and suggests the ability of the law to impose obligations on persons because of their
acquired relationship. Id. at 83-94.
170. Legal obligations have been imposed upon enterprises participating in mass production
and distribution for several basic reasons: such organizations are better able to bear the cost
and spread the risk of losses related to the products from which these enterprises profit; the
consumer possesses little bargaining power in his routine relations with these enterprises; the
consumer is unable to detect defects likely to cause injury; and the consumer cannot protect
himself from harm by avoiding contact with these organizations upon which he is dependent
for economic and social necessities. The use of these justifications indicates a reliance on the
relation between the parties, rather than on the intention or act of the defendant, in determin-
ing liability. The evolution of strict liability in the products liability area illustrates the return
to status liability concepts. See Rintala, supra note 153, at 116-19. Theories of modern-day
products liability represent this development in the law. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note
152, at 1279. See generally Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. Rv.
1077, 1086-87 (1965); Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between
the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RuTroERs L. Rv. 692 (1965).
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Proof of cause in fact, however, always has been required under status
concepts of liability.' 1 The identity of the owner, employer, landlord, or
carrier, whose duties included guarding against certain risks, also was
necessary for a cause of action.' 2 In cases premised on status liability, it
must be demonstrated that the defendant's failure to warn or breach of the
duty of care was the cause in fact of the injury.' 3 That is, the defendant's
act or omission must have been responsible in some material way, and as
a substantial element, in bringing about the plaintiff's injury.'7 ' The com-
mon law concept of status liability, therefore, cannot supply the analytical
justification for the court's imposition of liability absent an identification
of the cause in fact.' 7 A relatively recent force in American common law,
however, encourages assessing liability without proof of the cause in fact.
This force, known as the philosophy of legal realism, has shaped American
common law since the early 1900's.
Legal Realism
Notwithstanding the existence of natural law and its emphasis on in-
dividualism, the competing philosophy of legal realism arose in American
jurisprudence around the turn of the twentieth century. Contrary to natural
law's emphasis on individualism, legal realism focused on the attainment
of social goals and the fulfillment of social needs.' 6 Legal realists were most
concerned with the question of how courts should decide difficult or con-
171. Some specific relationship between the injured plaintiff and the defendant was necessary
before a cause of action could be maintained. See Rintala, supra note 153, at 83-94.
172. In addition, defendants operating businesses traditionally recognized as "common call-
ings," that is, those affecting a public interest, were burdened with extra duties of care. Because
the defendant voluntarily provided a public service, public expectations as to the proper perfor-
mance of that service were deemed sufficiently important to justify the imposition of additional
obligations. In the absence of such status, the defendant would be liable only to those plain-
tiffs with whom he was in priviLy. Id. at 89-91.
173. See Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W.2d 918 (1961);
Freedman, "Defect" in the Product: The Necessary Basis for Products Liability in Tort and
in Warranty, 33 TENN. L. REV. 323, 327 (1966).
174. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
175. The status approach to liability focuses on the position voluntarily assumed by the defen-
dant and the resulting relationship created with the plaintiff. The causal analysis involves deter-
mining whether the defendant, by assuming his status or performing his role in a particular
manner, gave rise to the events that produced the plaintiff's injury. See Rintala, supra note
153, at 84-89. The defendant's failure to meet public expectations that are considered deserving
of legal protection may form the substantial causal connection necessary for liability to attach.
The plaintiff, however, must be able to identify the defendant who caused the harm.
176. The idea that law should be a means to social ends in large part stemmed from a belief
that by placing paramount importance on societal interests, courts would be providing for "the
greatest total of interests or to the interests that weigh most in our civilization, with the least
sacrifice of the scheme of interests as a whole." Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 39 (1943). Support of legal realism arose at the end of the 19th century. As a
result, legal limitations were placed upon the formerly unbridled freedom to contract. For ex-
ample, statutes were passed which required wages to be paid in money instead of fungible
goods. See id. at 38.
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troversial lawsuits. "' The focus of legal thought shifted from the determina-
tion of individual rights to judicial decision making.' Whereas natural law
was oriented towards establishing permanent rights and rules, legal realism
was concerned with methodology. This shift in focus can be attributed, in
part, to the changing role of American courts in addressing the problems
of industrialization.' 9 The courts were confronted with increasingly com-
plex cases as a result of new legal issues arising from industrialization. In
this transitory period, American courts were re-analyzing many of the time-
honored societal maxims. The courts reexamined not only earlier rules and
precedents but also fundamental documents such as the Constitution. The
interpretation of precedents, as well as the interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, varied greatly from case to case.' 0 American lawyers found it difficult
to discover and describe the rules of historical jurisprudence upon which
the courts based their decisions.' 8 ' Thus, decisions had the effect of eroding
case law precedents.' 2 As the courts promulgated new law in politically con-
troversial areas, difficulties increased.' 3
Legal realists were skeptical of natural law because of its inability to
describe the courts' process.'14 These jurists argued that natural law had gone
177. The focus of legal realism is on analysis of process and procedure rather than on sub-
stantive legal rights. See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222
(1931) (discussion of the points of departure of legal realism from traditional inquiries into
substantive law). One recent commentator remarked that the most significant impact of legal
realism on modern legal education is "a widely shared skepticism about the value of learning
substantive 'rule' or 'principles'...." G. E. WHIm, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 63 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as WHITE]. See also K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 508-18 (1960) (discus-
sion reemphasizing that realism is nothing more than a method or process of analysis). See
generally R. POUND, 2 JURISPRUDENCE 349 (1959); W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1969)
[hereinafter cited as RUMBLE]; Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The
Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hart].
178. The process of judicial decision making advocated by legal realists includes a systematic
reexamination of the basis for legal rules, rather than a blind application of the rules without
concern for whether the circumstances justifying the creation of the rule continue to justify
its existence. See supra note 21 (Holmes advocates historical inquiry to determine the original
rationale behind the rules). See.generally K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, REALISM IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1962) [hereinafter cited as LLEWELLYN].
179. Pound commented on the two schools of thought. One viewed law as a system designed
to advance individual freedom; the other thought "of law not negatively as a system of hands
off while individuals assert[ed] themselves freely, but positively as a social institution existing
for social ends." POUND, supra note 21, at 197. The latter school of thought was deemed
the better approach as the courts found themselves facing new legal questions resulting from
industrialization. These new legal issues were answered inadequately because of earlier ingrained
views of the role of the courts.
180. See Hart, supra note 177, at 976-97.
181. See generally LLEWELLYN, supra note 178.
182. As new issues were raised, courts began to realize that they could not blindly apply
"rules and doctrines apart from the economic and social history of their time." Id. at 213.
183. See generally RUMBLE, supra note 177.
184. Legal realists criticized the "traditional" approach to law for failing to explain the nature
and operation of the legal system. Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J.
1037, 1039 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore]. Indeed, the primary fault found with other
CAUSE IN FACT
astray because it had taken a doctrinal approach to jurisprudence in con-
centrating on rules articulated in court decisions.' According to legal realists,
the natural law theorist's search for uniform rules was erroneous because
judges actually decided cases according to their own political and moral
beliefs. One commentator remarked that the "bias of realism was anti-
conceptual, anti-doctrinal," and that natural law encouraged the use of
generally stated rules of law that concealed, rather than explained, the bases
of judicial decisions. 8 ' By focusing on the intellectual and psychological pro-
cess of judicial decision making, legal realists believed they were more
accurately defining the law.87
Legal realism was augmented by another legal philosophy known as legal
positivism. Legal positivism stood for the tenet that law was created by
political superiors and could not be discovered through moral principles. 88
Proponents of legal positivism denied the existence of any self-evident or
inherent principles."8 9 Legal principles were not quietly awaiting discovery
legal theories was their focus upon the decisions rather than the method by which they were
reached. Legal realists believed that cases should be decided exclusively on the facts of the
case at bar and not on the basis of rules formulated under circumstances that no longer existed.
Accordingly, legal realists viewed precedent as "simply a gimmick by which clever judges fool
other people and stupid judges occasionally fool themselves. The study of doctrine-of rules
of law-[was thought largely to be] sterile and absurd." Id. at 1038.
185. In concentrating on precedent, the legal system became increasingly out of touch with
the prevailing popular notions of justice. Consequently, the decisions reflected a divergence
between legal concepts and popular concepts regarding the role of the courts. See Pound, The
Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907). To correct this deficiency
in the judicial system, legal realists advocated a study of these rules. They considered not only
how the rules developed and evolved, but also the social effects of such rules and the societal
objectives advanced by their application. See Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological
Jurisprudence (pts. 1 & 2-3), 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARv. L. REV. 140, 489 (1912).
186. Gilmore, supra note 184, at 1038.
187. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (the "law" is divided into two
spheres: "actual law," or already decided cases, and "probable law," or a prediction as to
the consequences of any given action). For a discussion of basic legal definitions according
to one realist, see generally Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 431 (1930).
188. See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 43-95 (1940). See generally J. GRAY,
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1927).
189. Holmes contended that principles develop and change as society changes. Rather than
adhere to principles developed in an earlier time, he suggested that "our only interest in the
past is for the light it throws upon the present." 0. W. HOLMES, The Path of The Law in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 194-95 (1920). By placing precedent in proper perspective, the
legal realists sought to create a legal system that was better able to cope with the complexities
of a modern society unfettered by the constraints of existing rules. See Gilmore, supra note
184, at 1039. In contrast, natural law theorists argue that the one principle that is self-evident
in law is that of morality; all law must be grounded in some moral principle.
Professor H.L.A. Hart, a strong proponent of positivism, maintains that a legal system does
not lose its "legal character" because its laws do not reflect a component of morality. See
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). Hart
was criticized, however, by Professor Lon Fuller, who, in response to Hart's assertion that
the Nazi regime constituted a legal system, replied: "To me there is nothing shocking in saying
that a dictatorship which clothes itself with tinsel of legal form can so far depart from the
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as natural law had insisted, but rather were purely an application of man-
made law.'9 This manmade law first was promulgated by the state
legislatures, and then by the courts, to contend with societal wants and needs
in particular situations.'"' Legal positivism became the philosophical corner-
stone for the social utilitarian-what was good for society as a whole was
right and just.
The combination of legal realism, legal positivism, and the common law
notions of status largely have been responsible for modern day product
liability law. '92 The realists' and positivists' insistence on the satisfaction of
the needs of such societal groups as consumers, employees, and tenants over-
rode the natural law theorists' insistence on the protection of individual rights
and the doctrine of fault.'" The combination of status law principles and
the legal philosophies of realism and positivism eventually led to the elimina-
tion of cause in fact in certain situations. This combination influenced judicial
decisions in that courts began to determine and prioritize society's needs.
The California Cases
In certain situations, the three forces of status liability, legal realism, and
legal positivism have been stronger than doctrines that protect the individual.
The California cases of Ybarra v. Spangard, ' " Summers v. Tice,'" and Haft
v. Lone Palm Hotel,'9 6 represent instances where the forces of individualism
were overcome and the burden was shifted to the defendant to demonstrate
the absence of cause in fact. Before analyzing these cases, the type of cause
in fact problem considered by the California courts must be understood.
Courts had defined cause in fact to mean that the defendant's action was
a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's
injury.' Yet, this definition was not suitable when courts were confronted
with situations where there were potentially multiple causes of the injury,
morality of order, from the inner morality of law itself, that it ceases to be a legal system."
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630,
660 (1958). See W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 154, 294-95 (3d ed. 1953).
190. In the area of torts, White notes that the legal realists did not believe that there were
certain immutable principles reflected in the cases. "For the Realists [tort law] was seen as
a collection of individual claims linked, if at all, by the interests they affected, or the social
policies they tested, or perhaps, the analytical inquiries they regularly posed." WHITE, supra
note 177, at Ill.
191. The realist rejected, however, any notion that his law embodied universal principles.
Id. at 112.
192. Although products liability law did not fully emerge until after World War II, White
finds its origin in the realism movement of 1910-1940. Id. at 168-73.
193. Id. Although the various forces may be labelled differently, the broader implications
of realism, positivism, and sociological jurisprudence movements have been demonstrated by
the reliance and focus on manmade law.
194. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
195. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
196. 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
197. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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but only one cause in fact produced the injury. 19 One commentator argued
that in these types of factual situations, a cause in fact determination became
a matter of strict conjecture.' 99
An example of this type of factual scenario was presented in Summers
v. Tice °0  In Summers, three men were hunting quail. The men spread out
in a line to flush out the quail, but the plaintiff on the right inadvertently
moved ahead of the other two hunters. The defendant on the far left roused
a quail which flew towards the plaintiff who unknowingly had moved ahead.
Both defendants fired and the plaintiff sustained injury to his right eye from
the shot of one of the defendants' guns."' Contrasted with a typical multiple
cause case where both of the defendants' actions contribute to the injury,
in Summers only one of the defendants' shots caused the plaintiff's injury.
The plaintiff was unable to prove which defendant's shot struck him
because both defendants had fired simultaneously and were using the same
type of gun and cartridge. 02
The Summers case presented a new analytical problem: How does a plain-
tiff proceed to establish liability when there are multiple possible defendants,
only one of whom was the cause in fact of the injury? The defendants in
Summers moved for a directed verdict because the plaintiff could not prove
which of the defendants' actions was the "but for", or the sine qua non,
of the plaintiff's injury. 23 Nor could the plaintiff prove that one of the
defendants' acts standing alone was a "substantial factor" in bringing about
the plaintiff's injury. 04 Because the plaintiff shouldered the burden of proving
cause in fact, and could not meet it, defendants argued that they were ab-
solved from liability.
The California Supreme Court did not agree with the defendants'
198. This limitation of the "material element" test must be contrasted with the limitations
of the "but for" test. The "but for" test was inadequate when multiple causes in fact may
have produced the injury, whereas the limitation of the material element test comes about when
there are possible multiple causes, but only one cause in fact exists. See supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
199. Malone demonstrates that there is an inherent fallacy in attempting to set forth a test
to determine cause in fact in all situations. Using the "but for" test as an example, which
ostensibly could be argued, is the test which best approaches the determination of the actual
cause of an injury, Malone points out that because legal tests are not self-executing, a judge
or jury must determine what would have happened to the plaintiff absent the defendant's con-
duct. Malone states: "The very uncertainty as to what might have happened opens the door
wide for conjecture. . . . We can never be absolutely certain that our estimate is correct."
Malone, supra note 16, at 67 (emphasis in original). A cause in fact determination can only
be as sound as the correctness of the inferences drawn by the judge or jury from the eviden-
tiary facts. Where potentially there were multiple causes of an injury and only one possible
cause in fact, the problem of conjecture becomes multiplied.
200. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
201. Id. at 82, 199 P.2d at 2. The plaintiff actually was hit in both his eye and jaw; however,
only one of the shots actually caused the major injury to his eye.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 83-84, 199 P.2d at 2-3.
204. Id.
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arguments and, instead, shifted the burden of proof to the defendants. °5
In shifting the burden, the court did not rely on a probability theory to
ascertain whether the defendants were the cause in fact of plaintiff's
injuries.206 Rather, the court carved out an exception to the cause in fact
requirement on the following grounds: where both defendants were
wrongdoers and the plaintiff is unable to prove which defendant caused the
injury, the burden of proof shifts to the defendants."' Once the burden
is shifted, the court gives each defendant the opportunity to prove he was
not the cause in fact of the injury." 8 The California court essentially shifted
its emphasis from that of protecting the "innocent until proven otherwise"
defendant to protecting the innocent, injured plaintiff.
One commentator of Summers queried whether a court could stand idly
by to watch "two wrongoers ...pass the ball of legal responsibility back
and forth between themselves while the outraged victim stands helplessly on
the sideline." 2 9 Other commentators of the Summers decision predicted that
this shifting of the burden would extend to situations in which the defen-
dant had a greater ability than the plaintiff to prove the cause in fact of
the injury."' These sentiments indicate a perceived willingness in the legal
community to alter the requirement of cause in fact when presented with
compelling circumstances.
If the factual situation of Summers were confronted by a jurisdiction whose
courts favored the maxims of individualism, the courts would reason that
the plaintiff was responsible for choosing his hunting partners and therefore,
he took the chance that his fellow hunters would not be careful and prudent.
Plaintiff, in a sense, bore the risk of injury by electing to hunt with them.
Defendants would only be responsible if they contracted to bear the respon-
sibility, intended the harm, or were identified by the plaintiff as the
wrongdoer who brought about his harm.
Other societal forces support shifting the burden of proving cause in fact
to the defendant. The realist would view the need to protect society from
negligent hunters as overriding the need to protect the individual's right to
hunt from intrusion by the state. Because hunters use deadly weapons, society
may demand that hunters be more responsible for their actions.2 ' Gun safety
205. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
206. Id. at 84, 199 P.2d at 3.
207. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
208. Id. at 88, 199 P.2d at 5.
209. Malone, supra note 16, at 83.
210. See Note, Joint Tort Feasors and Burden of Proof, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 412 (1950).
See also Note, Negligence-Impossible Actual Cause Burden, 27 TEX. L. REv. 732 (1949)
(Summers shifts the burden of proof to the defendant as justice requires).
211. See Davison v. Flowers, 123 Ohio 91, 174 N.E. 137 (1930) (defendant had duty to
plaintiff hunting companion to exercise ordinary care in handling a loaded gun); Winas v.
Randolph, 169 Pa. 606, 32 A. 622 (1895) (members of hunting party each had a duty to guard
against accidental discharge of weapons); Inbau, Firearms and Legal Doctrine, 7 TUL. L. REV.
529, 551-55 (1933) (courts have adopted a flexible approach in assessing liability in negligent
hunter cases).
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is a high priority in society, and therefore, the need for accountability of
hunters as a class is great. These considerations most probably had an im-
pact in overriding the cause in fact requirement, although they were not
articulated by the Summers court.
A California case that was decided prior to Summers, had also taken ex-
ception to the cause in fact element. In Ybarra v. Spangard,1 2 the plaintiff
underwent surgery to have his appendix removed. Prior to the operation,
he was anesthetized. After the operation, plaintiff developed paralysis in his
right arm and atrophy of the muscles of the right shoulder and arm. 21 3 The
plaintiff sued all the doctors, nurses, and technicians involved in the opera-
tion. Because the plaintiff had been unconscious during the operation, he
was unable to prove which defendant's negligence was the cause in fact of
his injury.
The court determined the question of negligence by applying the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. 21 1 In analyzing the case under the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, the court agreed with the plaintiff that the instrumentality of the
operation had been in the collective control of the defendants, the injury
was of a type that ordinarily occurred as a result of negligence, and the
defendants were in a better position to know what had occurred than the
plaintiff." 5 Finding that these basic elements of res ipsa loquitur were
satisfied, the court permitted the plaintiff to recover from all defendants.
Ybarra, although often cited for its application of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, also presented a cause in fact problem2 ' in that both the specific
act of negligence and the actor or causal agent who in fact caused the
negligence were unknown. The cause in fact issue, however, was not directly
212. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
213. Id. at 488, 154 P.2d at 688.
214. Res ipsa loquitur is a judicially created doctrine that enables a plaintiff to establish
an inference of negligence without proving that the defendant was the cause in fact of the
injury. To invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur:
(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone's negligence;
(2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant;
(3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the plaintiff.
Id. at 489, 154 P.2d at 689 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 295 (1st
ed. 1941). Cf. Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 MINN. L. REV.
1043 (1962) (res ipsa loquitur, as applied, amounts to nothing more than a presumption of
liability unless the physician can prove that he was without fault) [hereinafter cited as Adamson);
Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646 (1950) (the
extension of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to cases where there is no evidence from which
an inference can be drawn, and where a number of persons could have caused the injury,
is merely a means for the court to achieve social ends but does not comport with the under-
lying rationale of the original doctrine).
215. 25 Cal. 2d at 490-91, 154 P.2d at 689-90.
216. See Adamson, supra note 214, at 1045-47 (many unanswered questions as to the facts
of the case, and the jury deliberation process was subject to speculation).
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addressed by the Ybarra court. Perhaps the rationale which later governed
Summers was implicit in the reasoning in Ybarra. In both cases, all known
defendants were joined in the action, and the injury was of a sort that
ordinarily occurred only as a result of negligence. Yet, in contrast to the
Summers situation where all defendants were deemed wrongdoers, some, if
not a majority, of the Ybarra defendants may have acted without negligence.
It is also possible that the person at fault in Ybarra was not named as a
defendant. An employee of an independent contractor, working outside the
scope of his employment, may have been the cause in fact. This possibility
was not accounted for by the Ybarra court. Rather, the Ybarra court im-
posed upon all named defendants the burden of proving absence of cause
in fact and negligence.2" ' These burdens of proof were shifted to the named
defendants because of the likelihood that they were responsible despite plain-
tiff's inability to identify and connect them to his harm." 8
The forces of status liability are easily recognizable in Ybarra. The medical
profession has assumed a position, a certain status in society, that imposes
a duty (and concomitantly more of a burden) of accountability to the in-
dividuals it serves. The medical profession's special role in society requires
that it be held to a higher standard of care.2"9
The automatic imposition of a higher standard of care is not free from
criticism, however, in light of the different defendants involved in Ybarra.
Although the nurses and technicians are an essential component of the medical
profession, they undoubtedly have a different relationship with the patient
than the doctor does. The nurses and technicians are generally less respon-
sible and less knowledgeable than the attending physician. Furthermore, they
are directed by and subordinate to the physician. Ybarra, however, did not
distinguish between the duties owed by each of the defendants or the status
each defendant had with respect to the patient.120 Instead, the Ybarra court
shifted the burden to all defendants to prove the absence of cause in fact.
The burden was shifted to the defendants in Ybarra because the status
concept coincided with the demand of realism-that a strong societal need
supersede individual rights. The strong societal need involved was the pro-
tection of the helpless, unconscious patient-consumer. The Ybarra court sum-
marized this need: "This . . .places upon them [the defendants] the burden
of initial explanation. Plaintiff was rendered unconscious for the purpose
of undergoing surgical treatment by the defendants; it is manifestly
unreasonable for them to insist that he identify any one of them as the per-
son who did the alleged negligent act."22. The court further stated that the
217. 25 Cal. 2d at 490-91, 154 P.2d at 690.
218. Id. at 492, 154 P.2d at 690.
219. This status relationship of physician-patient acquired special importance in Ybarra because
the plaintiff patient was unconscious and was completely at the mercy of the physicians. Although
the court did not explicitly refer to its decision as one based on status, it did note that the
plaintiff's unconsciousness was perhaps the most compelling reason to extend the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to these situations. Id. at 490-91, 154 P.2d at 690.
220. Id. at 492-92, 154 P.2d at 690.
221. Id. at 492, 154 P.2d at 690 (emphasis added).
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"number of those in whose care the patient is placed is not a good reason
for denying him all reasonable opportunity to recover for negligent harm.
It is rather a good reason for re-examination of the statement of legal theories
which supposedly compel such a shocking result." '222
It should be noted that there is language in the Ybarra opinion that gives
rise to the identification of a third force operating against individualism.
That is, the court seemed to distrust the size and complexity of the defen-
dant hospital.223 It could be argued that the court held the hospital to a
higher standard of care because its size and complexity might enable it to
escape responsibility in certain circumstances.2 2
Finally, the California Supreme Court in Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel,2 5
raised an interesting issue concerning cause in fact. In Lone Palm Hotel,
a father and his five year old son drowned in a pool where there was no
lifeguard on duty. 226 The pool did not have adequate warnings concerning
the depth and other dangers of the pool.227 Because there were no witnesses
to the drowning, no one could provide any substantial information concerning
the cause of the accident. 22" Thus, it was unknown whether the Lone Palm
Hotel's negligence or intervening acts of negligence caused the deaths. 229
Although it was clear that the Lone Palm Hotel was negligent in its failure
to provide a lifeguard and its failure to sufficiently warn about the dangers
of swimming in the pool, a causal connection between the hotel's negligence
and the injury could not be established. The court considered the absence
222. Id. at 491-92, 154 P.2d at 690. The court noted that modern hospital care involves
coordinated efforts by numerous persons who may have varying legal relationships with the
defendant hospital. For example, hospital personnel may be viewed as either independent con-
tractors or employees. But the court went on to state that it did not believe "that either the
number or relationship of the defendants alone determines whether ...res ipsa loquitur ap-
plies." Id. at 491, 154 P.2d at 690. All defendants, the court held, who had control over
the plaintiff during any time of the operation would be liable notwithstanding their differing
legal relationships with the defendant hospital. Id. at 491-92, 154 P.2d at 690.
223. Id. at 493-94, 154 P.2d at 691.
224. Id. The court hinted at this when it stated:
A hospital today conducts a highly integrated system of activities, with many
persons contributing their efforts. There may be, e.g., preparation for surgery by
nurses and interns who are employees of the hospital; administering of an anesthetic
by a doctor who may be an employee of the hospital, an employee of the operating
surgeon, or an independent contractor; performance of an operation by a surgeon
and assistants who may be his employees, employees of the hospital, or indepen-
dent contractors; and post surgical care by the surgeon, a hospital physician,
and nurses.
Id.
225. 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
226. Id. at 761-63, 478 P.2d at 467-68, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 747-48.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 762, 478 P.2d at 467, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
229. There might have been intervening negligence of the father for the son's death, or
negligence of the son for the father's death. Each decedent could have been contributorily
negligent for his own death. There may have been foul play or negligence on the part of some
unknown swimmer. It could not be determined which of these possible persons or causes were
the causes in fact of the deaths.
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of a lifeguard to be the cause of the lack of an observer. 3 ' The failure
to provide a lifeguard was part of the negligence of the defendant because,
presumably, if a lifeguard had been on duty, the cause of the accident would
have been known. 3' Furthermore, a lifeguard might have prevented the
drownings.232 The court shifted the burden of proof to the defendant both
because of the foreseeability of the harm resulting from the failure to have
a lifeguard on duty and, also, because of the likelihood that a lifeguard
could have proven the cause in fact.233
The position of the Lone Palm Hotel court was essentially the same as
that of Ybarra-the plaintiff only had to produce evidence that gave rise
to an inference of the negligence which was the proximate cause of the
injury. ' Such a rule clearly favors the plaintiff because the burden of proving
causation is shifted once there is a determination of wrongdoing.
Other forces also were involved in the Lone Palm Hotel decision. The
court stressed that the status of the defendant as a public pool owner im-
posed a higher duty. 3 The realists' "needs analysis" also underlines the
Lone Palm Hotel decision. The court, in a footnote, referred to Calabresi's
cost benefit analysis that assigns liability to the party in the best position
to distribute losses.23 ' This analysis comports with the realists' theory because
the right of a person to be free from unwarranted intrusion is sacrificed
to benefit the public good.
In summary, the emphasis on proximate cause in Summers, Ybarra, and
Lone Palm Hotel, clouded the issue of cause in fact. In these cases, an ex-
amination of the causation issues was by-passed to reach the proximate cause
issue. Essentially the blameworthiness, or the societal interest in prohibiting
the defendants' particular negligence, was so strong that a cause in fact con-
nection was viewed as unnecessary. The determination of proximate cause
ostensibly deemphasized the requirement of cause in fact. These decisions,
therefore, are merely conclusions or determinations that impose legal liability
upon the defendants. The rule, as evidenced by these cases, is that a prima
facie case is made when a plaintiff produces evidence which simply infers
wrongdoing or negligence, and this wrongdoing, even though not proved
in fact to be causally connected to the injury, nevertheless may give rise
to liability. The courts found no injustice in shifting the burden because
230. Id. at 771, 478 P.2d at 474-75, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 754-55.
231. Id. at 769, 478 P.2d at 472-73, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 752-53.
232. Id. at 772 n.18, 478 P.2d at 475 n.18, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755 n.18.
233. Id. at 772, 478 P.2d at 475, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
234. Id. at 773, 478 P.2d at 475-76, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755-56.
235. Id. at 767, 478 P.2d at 471, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 751. The duty of the defendant pool
owner was defined and imposed by statute. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24101.4 (West
1967) (Code required lifeguard service, and in the absence of such service, mandated that signs
be posted that clearly indicated that no lifeguard was on duty).
236. 3 Cal. 3d at 775 n.20, 478 P.2d at 477 n.20, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 757 n.20. See generally
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961)
(economic justifications for enterprise liability, loss allocation, and deep-pocket theories).
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the defendants, in fact, were wrongdoers and were negligent in some way.
The Need for Corporate Accountability
The importance of the cause in fact requirement stems from the burden
it places on the plaintiff to establish the minimal relationship between the
injury and the defendant before the defendant is forced to raise a defense.
Absent this minimal showing, the defendant has a right to be free from
intrusion, and the plaintiff must bear his own loss. As previously discussed,
plaintiff's burden arises from the philosophy of individualism which pro-
tects the individual defendant from the collective power of the state. In short,
the individual's security, property rights, and right to be free from interference
are protected by the cause in fact requirement.
Arguably, the need for the cause in fact element is diminished when the
persons or entities allegedly committing a wrongdoing have strong economic
power and, therefore, are better able to protect themselves. Although never
articulated by the courts, there seems to be an increasing need for more
accountability237 and a greater assumption of responsibility when the harm
inflicted upon an individual can be traced, however tenuously, to a large,
diversified, and powerful business defendant. 2" When the state resolves a
dispute with this type of defendant in mind, it becomes, through the ex-
ercise of judicial power, the protector of the individual plaintiff's right to
be free from harm and intrusion. Indeed, when dealing with this type of
defendant, individuals may be better protected when the cause in fact require-
ment is overlooked. 23
9
The large publicly held corporation is a prime example of an entity from
which the individual plaintiff must be specially protected. 20 Generally, the
corporate entity is mistrusted in American society because, as a practical
matter, corporations are managed primarily for the purpose of producing
profits. This pursuit of profit may cause a corporation to have a less active
237. The need for corporate accountability is closely associated with the new status concept,
discussed supra notes 154-75 and accompanying text. The common law policy of protecting
the public from certain enterprises is a discernable undertone in modern concepts of status
and corporate liability. The corporation is especially susceptible to this accountability because
of its size, power, and complexity. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 152, at 1253 (due to
critical services that these corporations provide and the superiority of their bargaining power,
obligations flowing from status, rather than from contractual relations, are imposed). See also
B. WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION § 1 (1911) ("free competition fails in some cases
to secure the public good" and state control may be necessary); Arterburn, The Origin and
First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 423 (1927) (economic conditions and
monopolistic practices may give rise to imposition of a public duty upon a private enterprise).
See generally F. HALL, THE CONCEPT OF A BUSINEss AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST (1940);
Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies (pt. 1), 11 COLUM.
L. REV. 514 (1911).
238. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
239. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 152, at 1251-55.
240. See Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90
YALE L.J. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Stone].
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"social conscience. 2 '4 1 In addition, the sheer size of the modern corporate
entity affords it considerable economic leverage with which to pursue its
objectives. The citizenry is left to rely on the legislature and the judiciary
to impose a public duty upon the large, modern corporation to insure
accountability. " Because a corporation is more powerful than an individual
241. Stone remarks that "more and more it is [corporations] ... who produce, pollute,
[and] swindle . . ." Id. at 27. Stone also criticizes the size of governmental bodies and their
corresponding tendency to become wasteful and antagonistic toward social progress:
Such mischief as these non-business institutions threatened is neither more confined
nor more controllable because it is not motivated by profit. A mismanaged pension
fund can sadden as many lives as a mismanaged assembly line. Government bureaus
motivated by various "policy reasons" have committed any number of acts that
were not nice, and some that were illegal. And in the name of science, things have
been done that greed would shrink from.
Id. at 2.
242. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 152, at 1243 (public duties should be imposed upon
corporate enterprises). Stone suggests that different tort principles be applied to the corporation:
The law grew up around notions of what was possible, effective, and just in the
control of ordinary human beings in ordinary, extra-institutional contexts. As cor-
porations came to assume an increasingly prominent role in social activity, the law,
by the simple device of deeming them "persons," fitted corporations into the pre-
existing system for the control of misconduct. But the value of these borrowed
approaches is becoming more and more suspect as applied to modern complex
bureaucratic organizations and to those who labor within them. Hence, some re-
evaluation is in order of the premises and techniques that underlie our efforts to
control corporate conduct.
Such a reevaluation demands that we accord the control of corporate organiza-
tions the concentrated attention of an independent field of law. This requires us
to be prepared, on the one hand, to recognize the fundamental differences between
formal organizations and ordinary persons, and, on the other, to appreciate the
significant features that the several organizational types possess in common, and
on which a comprehensive approach to corporate control must build. An article
such as this, which singles out business corporations for sustained consideration,
can provide at best a prolegonemon to the creation of the necessary model. Never-
theless, at least two insights of common and considerable significance can be gleaned
from the discussion.
First, it seems evident that, of all the types of corporate bureaucracy that the
law may seek to discipline, the business corporation is most appropriately suited
to the technique of enterprise liability. Ideals of acceptable social conduct are con-
veniently transmitted in monetary signals that the business organization can translate,
in turn, into its native tongue, the language of profits and losses. The approach
has the further advantage of entrusting to the superior expertise of the enterprise
participants the task of putting their own house in order. Yet even as applied to
the business corporation, where we can expect them to work best, enterprise liability
measures, with their "black box" respect for interior relationships, have their limits.
In some circumstances, it becomes necessary to replace or reinforce enterprise liability
with various interventionist techniques that restrict the autonomy of the par-
ticipants. . ..
Second, the selection of techniques cannot be implemented with tunnel vision.
The aims that are sought through one technique-say, criminal penalties against
agents-can be undone by independent techniques such as idemnification of the
agent under state codes. The most rationally calculated threats against the enter-
prise can be mocked by bars to judgment, such as limited liability in the case of
the business corporation. What is required is an imaginative coordination of the
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plaintiff and because a corporation's purely economic motives are sometimes
suspect, the courts may not feel troubled in calling upon a corporation to
bear the burden of disproving cause in fact.
Upon closer analysis, however, this argument is insufficient to cause the
burden to shift. Although the corporation is viewed as an economic entity
with considerable power, those affected by this requirement of a higher stan-
dard of accountability are the individual shareholders who will suffer
diminished returns on their investments and the individual consumers who
will pay higher prices. The shareholders and consumers, however, are removed
from the concerns of the injured individual and will provide little incentive
for greater corporate accountability. Moreover, the fact that there are many
shareholders and consumers to bear the burden makes the burden less op-
pressive to the defendant corporation. Basically, the corporation can distribute
the burden of increased corporate accountability to society as a whole.
Nonetheless, in products liability cases, the force for greater corporate
accountability adds to the impetus against the cause in fact requirement.
This force must be of sufficient strength to justify a finding of liability even
though an element of fault or wrongdoing is tenuous. Rather than searching
for the agent of the wrongdoing, as in Summers, Ybarra, and Lone Palm
Hotel, products liability cases focus instead on the defective product. " '3 Proof
of cause in fact becomes secondary to enforcement of the duty of a manufac-
turer to produce a safe product for the consumer. In a products liability
case liability may be imposed even though the defendant manufacturer had
neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the defect. The manufacturers,
for instance, may lack the ability to know or discover the defect and still
be liable. Yet this "innocence" does not protect theodefendant. On the con-
trary, the burden may shift because of the particular characteristics of the
defendant. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories2"' illustrates the extent to which
this imposition of a higher corporate accountability on a publicly held cor-
poration has facilitiated the erosion of the plaintiff's burden to prove cause
in fact.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
In Sindell, the plaintiffs were the daughters of women who had taken
the drug DES around 1947 to help avoid miscarriage during pregnancy." 5
DES was first marketed in 1941 and continued on the market until 1971.
many areas that provide the whole panoply of liabilities, privileges, immunities,
and indemnities on which the law is framed.
Stone, supra note 240, at 76-77.
243. See Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 900-07 (1967). For a discussion of
this point in relation to cigarettes and drugs, see Rossi, The Cigarette-Cancer Problem: Plain-
tiff's Choice of Theories Explored, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1961); Comment, Cigarettes and
Vaccine: Unforseeable Risks in Manufacturer's Liability Under Implied Warranty, 63 COLUM.
L. REv. 515 (1963); Note, The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case Study of Manufacturers'
Liability Without Fault in Tort and Warranty, 65 YALE L.J. 262 (1955).
244. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
245. Id. at 593 n.1, 607 P.2d at 925 n.1, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133 n.l.
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During this time, the drug allegedly '46 was never tested for its effectiveness
in helping to prevent miscarriages.2 " In 1971, however, the Food and Drug
Administration determined that DES contained a carcinogenic substance which
was linked to cancerous growths in the daughters of the women who had
taken the drug.2"8
The major hurdle confronting the plaintiffs in Sindell was the determina-
tion of the cause in fact of their injury-which drug company sold the DES
to each individual's mother. 9 This determination proved insurmountable
for the plaintiffs." Over two hundred manufacturers of DES existed in
1947,25 and any evidence of the specific sales of DES to the plaintiffs'
mothers had long since been discarded. Additionally, many of the manufac-
turers that were in the market in 1947 were either bankrupt or beyond the
court's jurisdiction. 2 A final problem was that the DES manufactured by
one company was indistinguishable from another company's DES in that
DES was simply a chemical mixture with little or no variation in the manufac-
turers' final product. 3 Indeed, the plaintiffs in Sindell admitted their in-
ability to determine which company's product was the cause of their injury.2 5 4
The Supreme Court of California held that the plaintiffs did not have
to plead and prove the cause in fact element." ' In approaching "the issue
of causation from a different perspective, 25 6 the court held that the defen-
dants would be liable to the extent of their share of the market if the named
defendants collectively comprised a substantial "share" or "percentage" of
the DES market. 27 The court did not specifically define what constituted
a "substantial share" of a market, ' but noted that it had no difficulty
246. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that DES was never tested, although the Supreme
Court of California failed to comment on this assertion of fact. Id. at 595, 607 P.2d at 926,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
247. Id. at 594, 607 P.2d at 925-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34.
248. Id. at 593-94, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
249. The plaintiff Sindell was a cancer victim who had a malignant bladder tumor. Id. at
595-96, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. The plaintiff class represented a group of
women residents of California who had been exposed to DES before birth, regardless of whether
they knew of that fact. Id. at 593 n.1, 607 P.2d at 925 n.l, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133 n.1.
250. Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
251. Id. at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
252. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
253. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
254. Id. at 596-97, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
255. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
256. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
257. Id.
258. The court rejected the proposal set forth in one article that a "substantial market"
be comprised of at least 75-80% of the market. Comment, supra note 12, at 996-97. By doing
so, the court seemed to adopt a more flexible approach in determining what constitutes a sub-
stantial share. Considering that each industry has peculiar business aspects which might preclude
any hard and fast rule of defining "substantial share," the court's refusal to adopt any fixed
percentage was probably realistic and warranted. The Sindell court's approach permits a case-
by-case analysis of each industry in determining what constitutes a substantial share or percen-
tage of the market.
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in holding the named DES manufacturers liable because collectively they con-
stituted ninety percent of the market.25 9
In Sindell, unlike Summers, there was no claim that all possible individual
defendants who could have caused the injury were joined. There was,
therefore, a possible causal gap in that the defendant who was the cause
in fact of the injury may not have been among those joined in the lawsuit.26
It was also possible that the company that had been the cause in fact of
the plaintiffs' injuries in Sindell was bankrupt and that the plaintiffs would
not have recovered even if the precise cause in fact of their injury could
have been determined.
The California court considered a number of theories to obviate the cause
in fact element. It first considered the Summers reasoning that where all
possible defendants are joined and are in some way negligent toward the
plaintiff, the burden shifts to the defendants.26 Under the Summers rationale,
the plaintiff would not be required to isolate the responsible defendant. Not
all possible defendants, however, were joined in Sindell. In addition, in
Summers there was a fifty percent chance that one of the two hunters was
responsible, whereas in Sindell, there was, at best, only a one in two hun-
dred chance that a particular defendant was liable. Because of these distinc-
tions, the Sindell court rejected the Summers case as controlling.262
The Sindell court next considered the argument made by-the plaintiffs
that the defendants should be held liable under a concert of action theory.2"3
259. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
260. In Ybarra, there may have been possible intervening agents who were not hospital
employees and, therefore, not named in the complaint. Similarly, in Lone Palm Hotel there
may have been unknown but potential defendants involved in the pool accident who had not
been joined. See supra notes 213-14 & 226-34 and accompanying text.
261. 26 Cal. 3d at 599-602, 607 P.2d at 928-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136-39. See supra text
accompanying notes 203-08.
262. 26 Cal. 3d at 599-602, 607 P.2d at 928-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136-39.
263. Id. at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. The concert of action theory permits
the imposition of liability where the defendants, pursuant to a tacit understanding or other
cooperative behavior, act in unison to injure the plaintiff. See Comment, supra note 12, at
978-85; Note, Beyond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-Sindell, 14 IND. L. REV. 695, 700
(1981). Mere knowledge of the actions of other defendants may be sufficient to infer liability
under this theory, which evolved from the criminal law regarding conspiracy. See PROSSER,
supra note 2, § 46, at 292. Cf. State v. Newberg, 129 Or. 564, 278 P. 568 (1929) (defendant
who held spotlight while co-defendant fired fatal bullet was guilty of involuntary manslaughter).
An illustrative tort situation in which the theory has been applied is that in which two automobile
drivers, without express agreement, commence to drag race their cars. Both drivers are liable
for any injury to third persons where it is impossible to determine which driver actually caused
the injury. See Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968). This theory also has been
applied in situations in which apportionment of injury was difficult and defendants had knowledge
of each other's conduct. See, e.g., Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn.
1976) (since several companies caused chemical pollution rendering it impossible to apportion
the wrongfulness of each defendant, all the defendants may be held equally liable); Mitchell
v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453, 211 S.E.2d 744 (1974) (holding both doctors liable where one attempted
to cure injury caused by the other's malpractice without disclosing source of the injury to
plaintiff). The Sindell court rejected an application of this theory due to the insufficiency of
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Plaintiffs alleged that defendants (1) had failed to adequately test DES or
give sufficient warnings of the dangers of the drug, (2) erroneously relied
upon the tests performed by other drug manufacturers, and (3) took ad-
vantage of one another's marketing and promotional techniques.26 The court,
however, viewed such allegations as insufficient to support a concert of action
charge since plaintiffs did not allege that there was a tacit understanding
or a common plan among the' defendant manufacturers. The proof of a
collective wrongdoing by the DES manufacturers was simply not present in
the case.2
61
Third, the court examined the enterprise liability theory relied on in Hall
v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.226 In DuPont, thirteen children were in-
jured by blasting caps in twelve separate incidents between 1955 and 1959.267
The defendants were six American blasting cap manufacturers who virtually
comprised the entire blasting cap industry. 68 It was possible, however, that
a Canadian blasting cap company may have been the cause of some of the
injuries."' The DuPont court discerned that if the defendants operated
through an association in their safety and warning procedures, then the defen-
dants jointly controlled the risks and could be liable as an enterprise. 7 Proof
that one of the blasting caps that caused an injury was manufacturered by
one of the defendants in the association would impose liability on all defen-
dants. The Sihdell court rejected the DuPont rationale because of the disparity
in the number of possible defendants and because the plaintiffs could not
prove that the drug companies acted collectively as an enterprise by jointly
controlling the risks. 7 '
Each of these theories examined by the Sindell court emphasizes the lack
of any traditional means to establish responsibility in a case where cause
in fact cannot be proved. The plaintiffs could not establish a specific causal
the evidence to support the existence of a tacit agreement among the defendants. 26 Cal. 3d
at 604-06, 607 P.2d at 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
264. Id. at 604, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
265. Id. at 605, 607 P.2d at 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
266. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). According to the theory of enterprise liability, the
plaintiff only need demonstrate that all the defendants, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff,
manufactured a generically similar defective product based upon an industry-wide standard of
safety, and that the source of the product which caused the injury cannot be identified. See
Comment, supra note 12, at 995-1006; Note, Industry-Wide Liability: Solving the Mystery of
the Missing Manufacturer in Products Liability Law, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 139, 140 n.5.
(1981). Unlike the concert of action theory, the plaintiff need not show the existence of a
tacit understanding or knowledge on the part of the defendants. See supra note 263.
The theory of enterprise liability was first applied in Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co.,
345 F. Supp. 353 (E.P.N.Y. 1972). In invoking this theory, the DuPont court referred to the
fact that the case involved only six companies. Id. at 357. Because Sindell involved over 200
defendants, the Sindell court refused to rely on this theory. See infra text accompanying note 271.
267. 345 F. Supp. at 359.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 376-78, 386.
271. 26 Cal. 3d 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
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connection between a particular defendant and the injuries. There was no
allegation that any specific defendant contributed to the injury, but only
that each defendant contributed to the market by producing DES. Because
it was virtually impossible for the plaintiffs to bear the burden of proving
cause in fact, the court refused to impose such a burden. Instead, the Sindell
court adopted a market share liability theory,2 72 holding that each defen-
dant would be liable to the extent of its share of the market once manu-
facturers controlling a substantial portion of the market had been joined
as defendants." 3 The Sindell court held for the plaintiffs largely on grounds
of public policy: as between an innocent plaintiff and a defendant manufac-
turer, the defendant should, and is better able, to bear the cost of injury
to the plaintiff.27
'
Realism was a driving force underlying Sindell. An estimated three million
women27 5 whose mothers took DES were potentially in need of protection.
Yet, at least theoretically, the drug manufacturer is not "at fault" in a pro-
duct liability action unless proved otherwise. Both parties initially should
be "innocent" in the eyes of the court. Despite the need for protection of
possible innocent individual defendants, the nature of the defendants' business
in Sindell accounted for the court's decision to switch the burden and,
ultimately, to hold each defendant liable.
2 7 6
Perhaps if the defendants in Sindell had been sole proprietors or closely
held corporations, the court would not have shifted the burden. Defendants
in Sindell such as Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly & Co., and the Upjohn
Company obviously did not fit into these categories. It could be argued that
the court chose to protect the individual from the power of the collective
forces of the defendants17 7 because the individual consumers were more
helpless, innocent, and unprotected than the public corporations which
profited from the sale of DES. Furthermore, the burden shifted because the
defendants could more easily spread their losses.
2 78
Another consideration underlying the court's decision was that the drug
industry has a special responsibility to the modern consumer. "7 9 As drug
manufacturers, the defendants were quasi-medical entities which entered the
marketplace purporting to relieve the sufferings of others. This status gave
272. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
275. See N.Y. Times, May 17, 1977, at 18, col. 2 (city ed.). For a discussion of the history
and the extent of DES use, see Comment, supra note 12, at 963-67; Note, Proof of Causation
in Multiparty Drug Litigation, 56 TEx. L. REV. 125, 125-26 (1977).
276. 26 Cal. 3d at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 637-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
277. See Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 152, at 1251-55. In one DES suit, the plaintiff named
individual pharmacists as co-defendants but these defendants were dismissed. Bichler v. Willing,
58 A.D.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977). The claims against the pharmacists in Bichler were
dismissed because the pharmacists did not alter the product in any material way and had no
reason to know that the product was harmful. Id. at 333, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
278. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
279. Id.
19821
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rise to the imposition of a higher level of accountability, and manufacturers
appropriately should bear the cost of the injury. Furthermore, the complex-
ities of modern production and marketing techniques make increasingly
common a situation where an innocent consumer of a drug is unable to
identify the specific producer. In the Sindell court's view, courts may either
adhere rigidly to prior doctrine requiring cause in fact and thus deny recovery
to a Sindell-type plaintiff or modify traditional notions of causation to meet
new and challenging tort situations. 80 Clearly, the Sindell court favored
change, and as a result, the rationale supporting the cause in fact
requirement-protection of the individual from intrusion by the state-clearly
was violated.
The reaction to the Sindell decision has been varied. On the one hand,
there has been approval"' of Sindell's fulfillment of the societal need that
seemed to require someone other than the injured to bear the loss.282 It
could be argued, however, that the fundamental natural law of individual
rights has been violated because the shifting of the burden has occurred
without any requirement on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was
the cause in fact of the injury. In effect, the defendant can be held liable
because of its mere association with a particular product. This criticism
is related to a perceived decline of Puritanism and the philosophy of social
contract. Perhaps this criticism of the court's decision is also based on
the fear of the decline of the deep-rooted tradition which underlies cause
in fact and much of common law torts. Sindell also could be feared as
signalling the simultaneous rise of judicial and political activism in the
affairs of the individual.
Finally, Sindell left unanswered the question of whether its holding could
be applied to an individual defendant. The position that the requirement
of cause in fact is not necessary even when the defendant is an individual
might be subject to criticism from the legal realists and proponents of
positivism. They might argue that the law of Sindell, thus interpreted,
becomes a tool for the political and social ends of the particular judge to
be used against an individual defendant. In their viewpoint, however, the
law should be used for the political and social ends of society.
Further, a broad reading of Sindell would underscore the criticism of in-
dividualists in two ways. First, proponents would argue that the courts have
become nothing more than "little legislatures," creating law to achieve their
own perceived social objectives. Second, notwithstanding the validity of the
above criticisms, the decisions of courts, absent the cause in fact require-
280. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
281. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981) (market share
liability applied), aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 580-81 n.5, 436 N.E.2d 182, 186 n.5, 450 N.Y.S.2d
776, 780 n.5. (1982) (although the market share liability issue was not appealed, the court
cited Sindell with approval). See generally Podgers, DES Ruling Shakes Products Liability Field,
66 A.B.A. J. 827 (1980).
282. See supra notes 176-91 and accompanying text.
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ment to protect the individual defendant, become, at best, only a determina-
tion of the needs of society at a given point in time.
CONCLUSION
The controversy over the requirement of cause in fact raises the question
of whether its foundation is weakening. The elimination of the element of
cause in fact, or the removal of the burden requiring plaintiff's identifica-
tion of the causal agent of the harm, clearly indicates changes in these forces.
There is some question as to whether the Sindell court went too far. Still
undecided is whether the common law, developed from principles of in-
dividualism, can withstand the strain.2"3 The answer depends, to a great ex-
tent, on future interpretation of the Sindell decision. If interpreted broadly,
the adaptability of the common law to the new philosophy of market share
liability will be tested.
If Sindell is interpreted narrowly as being only applicable to large publicly
held corporations, then individualism will continue to be protected.8 '"
However, a clearer definition of the specific characteristics of the defendant
will be necessary. If a clearer definition is not forthcoming, or if the Sindell
case applies to individual defendants, then much of the common law is
truly shaken.
283. One commentator remarked on the evolution of common law principles and the decision
making process:
[L]aw is a process of decision. Legal institutions are not autonomous entities.
They are decisional agencies: part of a vast social process of value sharing and
distribution. In this conception of law, power and authority are crucial terms since
the pervasive issue is whether decisions are authoritative. Community expectations
as to who is to make decisions, the scope of their authority, and the relevant pro-
cedures are integral to legal definition. Otherwise decisions, however controlling
in fact, would not be law but rather exercises of naked power.
C. MURPHY, MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 70 (1978).
284. The failure to protect the corporate defendant, however, directly conflicts with the legal
fiction of corporate personhood. A narrow interpretation of Sindell places extra risks on the
large, publicly held corporation. A different tort standard-tending towards strict liability-is
created by Sindell for the defendants that are public corporations. Yet, it is probably more
appropriate to limit the Sindell rationale to public corporations because of the harshness in
imposing this liability on individual defendants. See Stone, supra note 240, at 76-77.
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